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Title - Governance Disclosures According to IIRC’s Integrated Reporting Framework – Are 
Annual Reports of Swedish Listed Companies in Line with the Framework?   
Background and problem - Integrated reporting is a hot topic today and is predicted to be the 
future of companies’ external reporting. In December 2013 a new framework on integrated 
reporting was released and one part of the framework concerns governance and how it supports 
the organization’s value creation. A recent study on integrated reporting in Sweden showed the 
area of governance to be poorly reported. However, no previous study in Sweden has examined 
the current state of governance disclosures compared to the <IR> framework in depth. This is 
important in order to find good examples of reporting to further enhance the development of 
integrated reporting. 
Purpose - This thesis aims to assess the extent to which Swedish listed companies comply with 
the guidelines in the <IR> framework’s content element governance using a self-constructed 
scoring system. Furthermore, the aim is to analyze the possible relationship between the results 
and the size of the company.   
Methodology - The purpose was fulfilled through an analysis of 21 annual reports of Swedish 
listed companies, seven from each segment on the OMX Nordic Stockholm, i.e. large, mid, and 
small cap. The annual reports were assessed using a self-constructed scoring system primarily 
based on the <IR> framework’s content element governance.  
Analysis and conclusions - The study found that the majority of the companies at least mention 
most of the aspects included in the <IR> framework. However, the average annual report needs 
large improvements before it can be claimed to be in line with the <IR> framework regarding 
the area of governance. Furthermore, the study found a relationship between the result of the 
study and the size of the company, meaning larger firms were more in line with the <IR> 
framework’s content element governance. 
Keywords - Integrated reporting, Corporate governance, Voluntary disclosures, Stakeholder 
theory, Legitimacy theory, Information asymmetry, Capital market transactions hypothesis, 
Agency theory, Self-constructed scoring system, Company size.  
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1. Introduction  
Integrated reporting is a hot topic in the accounting, audit, and advisory sector and is predicted 
by many to be the future of corporate reporting. A new framework on integrated reporting was 
published in December 2013 (IIRC 2014a). This thesis will focus on the area of governance 
within integrated reporting and on the extent to which today’s annual reports of Swedish listed 
companies meet the guidelines of integrated reporting regarding governance. The four 
headlines below are from the last months and highlight the importance and timeliness of 
integrated reporting. 
 
“Integrated reporting – a new way to communicate” (Rimér 2013, article published on FAR’s 
website, own translation) 
 
“A report for the 21st century” (Lennartsson 2014, article published in Balans, own 
translation) 
 
“A better way for corporate transparency and accountability” (Jafar 2014, article published 
in The National) 
 
“Integrated reporting – a Swedish competitive advantage” (Lennartsson 2013, article 
published in Balans, own translation) 
 
The first headline above is from an article summing up a lecture on integrated reporting held at 
Finforum, a conference in Sweden for CFOs, analysts, and accountants addressing listed 
companies’ communication with the market (FarAkademi 2014). The article asserts the 
importance of integrated reporting, i.e. to actually communicate what is being done, and 
informs about the new framework from the International integrated reporting council (IIRC) 
(Rimér 2013). 
 
The article with the headline “A report for the 21st century” is an interview with Göran 
Tidström, the former accountant and president of the European and international federation for 
accountants. Tidström talks about the fast and enthusiastic development of the new integrated 
reporting framework as well as the great interest it has received from a global and broad 
audience. Integrated reporting, Tidström argues, is not only a tool to improve the 
communication with the stakeholders; it is also a tool to improve the companies’ actions and 
the entire business model. (Lennartsson 2014) 
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“A better way for corporate transparency and accountability” is a headline found in the 
newspaper The National from the United Arab Emirates for an article that discusses the need 
for companies in the Arabian Gulf to be more transparent as a response to globalization. 
Globalization has further led to a complex reporting with many jurisdictions and stakeholders 
to satisfy. Therefore, as explained in the article, several Gulf companies have started to produce 
the more concise report called an integrated report. (Jafar 2014) 
 
The article behind the fourth headline argues that Swedish companies are likely to be faster at 
adapting to the integrated reporting framework than other countries since Swedish companies 
generally are far ahead in the sustainability questions (Lennartsson 2013). 
1.1 Background 
On the 9th of December 2013 the International integrated reporting council (IIRC) released the 
international integrated reporting (<IR>) framework (IIRC 2014a). IIRC is a global 
organization representing companies, standard setters, regulators, the accounting profession, 
investors, and Non-Governmental Organizations (IIRC 2014b). They have been working on the 
framework for integrated reports since their establishment in 2009 (IIRC 2014c). A company’s 
integrated report should explain how the business activities work and affect the outside world 
(Lennartsson, 2014), and the main purpose of the report is to inform stakeholders of how the 
organization creates value over time (IIRC 2013b). The <IR> framework defines value creation 
as increases, decreases or transformation of capitals. These capitals are, according to the <IR> 
framework, resources and relationships used and affected by an organization (IIRC 2013b).  
 
A publication by KPMG (2012) argues that the stakeholders of today demand a more holistic 
picture of the company with its value creation and a long-term view portrayed in the annual 
reports. This demand is, according to this publication, not fulfilled today. The demand is partly 
caused by the changing context in which companies operate and an increasing awareness 
among stakeholders that there is a correlation between sustainability and financial performance 
(PwC 2013c). Meeting the stakeholders’ demand for a more holistic picture by adding 
additional reports, included in or separate from the annual report, covering environmental and 
social performance, intellectual capital or governance, does not necessarily explain how these 
aspects affect each other (Abeysekera 2013). Increased quantity of information is therefore not 
necessarily the solution.  
 
What the IIRC is trying to accomplish with the framework is for the companies to display how 
they link their strategy, financial performance and governance with the social, environmental 
as well as the economic context in which they function (A4S 2014). By doing so, the report 
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will describe the company and its value creation process in a clear and concise way (IIRC 
2011). Thus, integrated reporting is said to minimize the gap between what stakeholders 
demand and what companies provide (KPMG 2012).  
 
Swedish companies are not obligated by law to follow the <IR> framework, since IIRC is 
neither a regulator nor a standard setter. However, companies can voluntarily choose to adopt 
the framework. Incentives for companies to voluntarily disclose include gaining legitimacy and 
reducing information asymmetry, capital cost, and agency problems. Thus, companies have an 
interest in fulfilling the stakeholders’ demand for integrated reporting. In fact, the Swedish 
accounting sector and many Swedish companies welcome the new framework (Lennartsson 
2013). Sweden has for a long time been a role model in the area of sustainability reporting 
(KPMG 2011) and one could think that Swedish companies should also be prominent regarding 
integrated reporting. Mikael Hagström, vice president and head of group financial reporting at 
Volvo, believes this is the case (Lennartsson 2013). A study conducted by the PwC (2013a) on 
the other hand shows that the studied companies on the NASDAQ OMX Stockholm (OMX 30) 
have room for improvement in several important areas of integrated reporting. The least well-
reported area was, according to the study, governance.  
 
Information on governance and the governance structure is of major importance in an integrated 
report. It adds credibility to the entire report and creates confidence in the company’s ability to 
successfully implement the business model and execute the strategy (IIRC 2013c). The IIRC 
recognizes the importance of governance and includes it as one of the content elements of the 
<IR> framework. The integrated report should provide insight about how the governance 
structure supports the company’s ability to create value in the short, medium, and long term 
(IIRC 2013b).  
1.2 Problem discussion and thesis contribution 
The motivation for this study was derived from (a) the positive effect integrated reporting is 
believed to have on minimizing the information gap between what stakeholders demand and 
what companies provide, (b) the importance of governance disclosure for the credibility of the 
annual report and for the confidence in the companies’ ability to create value, and (c) the 
absence of previous studies analyzing annual reports’ extent of compliance with the guidelines 
in the <IR> framework.  
 
No previous study has used the guidelines in the recently released <IR> framework as the basis 
for an in-depth examination of Swedish listed companies’ annual report. This study hereby 
contributes to the existing literature. Similar studies have, however, been conducted. Examples 
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include a recent study examining the similarities between annual reports and integrated reports, 
which found governance to be poorly disclosed (PwC 2013a). Other studies have focused on 
the quality of corporate governance reports, with various results (PwC 2013b). Thus, this thesis 
aims to construct a way to measure the state of governance disclosures compared to the 
guidelines in the <IR> framework in order to clarify the current state of Swedish listed 
companies’ governance disclosures and contribute with examples of good reporting of 
governance. This may enhance the development of best practice, which is believed to be a way 
to facilitate the implementation of integrated reporting (Lennartsson 2013).   
 
Furthermore, previous studies have mostly focused on the largest companies (for example PwC 
2013a). Therefore, this thesis includes annual reports from all three segments on the OMX 
Nordic Stockholm, i.e. large, mid, and small cap. Through this it was possible to analyze 
whether larger companies are more in line with the <IR> framework’s content element 
governance. 
1.3 Purpose and research questions 
This thesis aims to assess the extent to which Swedish listed companies comply with the 
guidelines in the <IR> framework’s content element governance using a self-constructed 
scoring system. Furthermore, the aim is to analyze the possible relationship between the results 
and the size of the company.   
 
The purpose can be broken down into the following research questions: 
1. To what extent do Swedish listed companies meet the guidelines in the area of governance 
presented in the <IR> framework?  
2. Can a relationship be seen between the extent of compliance with the <IR> framework’s 
content element governance and the size of the company, and if so, what are the possible 
explanations behind this relationship? 
1.4 Disposition 
This thesis begins with a presentation of the frame of reference. In order to construct the scoring 
system information had to be gathered about for example integrated reporting, governance and 
the <IR> framework. Thus, the methodology is to a high degree based on the frame of reference 
and is therefore presented after the frame of reference. In the methodology section the way the 
study was carried out and the motivations for this are also presented. In the following chapter, 
empirical results and analysis, the findings from the study are described, as well as 
explanations for these findings and connections to theories. These two sections are presented 
together in order to avoid repetition. In the chapter conclusions the main findings are stated and 
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the research questions of the thesis are answered. This section also includes implications for 
further research. The conclusions are followed by a list of references. All the annual reports 
used in the study and referred to in the text are gathered at the end of the reference list to make 
them easier to find. Lastly the appendices are found including for example a thorough 
presentation of the scoring system and how to apply it. 
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2. Frame of reference 
In this chapter background information on integrated reporting and governance is stated. 
Furthermore, the development and importance of integrated reporting and governance 
disclosures are outlined. In connection to this the Stakeholder theory, Legitimacy theory, 
Information asymmetry, Capital market transactions hypothesis, and the Agency theory are 
explained. The chapter ends with a presentation of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and 
an outline of previous conclusions drawn about the relationship between voluntary disclosures 
and the size of the company.  
2.1 What is integrated reporting? 
“The two great challenges of the 21st century – financial stability and sustainability – are 
interconnected” (Mervyn King – IFC 2012, p. 1). 
 
Integrated reporting is believed by many to be the way of combining these two essential areas, 
financial stability and sustainability, and a way to reach the overall goal of a sustainable society 
(IIRC 2013b; Eccles & Krzus 2010). Sustainability, in its broadest definition, addresses how 
actions of today impact the available choices of tomorrow (Crowther 2002). If unsustainable, 
the way business is done in the present will be more costly, or even impossible, in the future 
due to the decreased availability of needed resources. Sustainability therefore stresses that 
resources are consumed in line with the pace of regeneration (Aras & Crowther 2008).   
 
Integrated reporting is the result of a market-led demand on corporate reporting to be more 
transparent, concise and accountable. Stakeholders, particularly investors, demand more 
information than what can be found in the backward-focused financial reports (IIRC 2011; 
KPMG 2012). An integrated report is a report where an organization informs of how it creates 
value (IIRC 2014b). It links the information on strategy, performance, future outlook, and 
governance in one concise message, enabling the reader to assess how the organization creates 
and sustains value, not only short-term (IIRC 2014b; IIRC 2011). This is crucial to 
communicate particularly since some resources utilized by companies are finite in quantity and 
will therefore not be available in the future unless actions are taken to prevent this. Without 
such actions the company itself is not sustainable. Today’s corporate reporting is often blamed 
for failing to communicate this linkage and one reason is the development of presenting non-
financial information1 in a separate report with no connection to the rest of the report (Eccles 
& Krzus 2010).   
                                               
1 Non-financial information is a widely used term with several definitions. According to Eccles & Krzus 
(2010), non-financial information includes intangible assets, Key Performance Indicators and, 
information on environmental, social and governance issues.   
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The integrated report is anticipated by the IIRC (2011) to be the primary report for companies, 
a supplement rather than a complement to existing reports. This means including mandatory 
and voluntary information but with materiality 2  as guidance in order to reduce clutter. 
However, the report should contain clear references to more detailed information, for instance 
online, to enable users to further explore different issues (Eccles & Krzus 2010).  
2.1.1 IIRC  
The International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) was established in 2009 (IIRC 2014c) 
and consists of regulators, investors, companies, standard setters, the accounting profession, 
and Non-Governmental Organizations (IIRC 2013b). The board includes Mervyn King (IIRC 
2014g), who is sometimes referred to as the Doyen for corporate governance (EY 2014). From 
the start the aim of the IIRC has been to create a globally accepted framework on integrated 
reporting in order to reach the long-term vision of introducing and embedding integrated 
thinking into the business (IIRC 2014d). Integrated thinking is a prerequisite for enabling 
integrated decision-making that considers value creation in the short, medium and long term 
(IIRC 2013b).  
2.1.2 The <IR> framework 
As a first step towards the <IR> framework a discussion paper outlining integrated reporting 
was released in September 2011 (IIRC 2011; IIRC 2014e). In April 2013 the consultation draft 
was presented, followed by three months of global consultation and submission of 359 
comments to the IIRC from organizations representing all regions of the world and a variety of 
sectors (IIRC 2014h). On December 9th 2013 the <IR> framework was released (IIRC 2014a).  
Companies are not obligated by law to follow the framework, instead it is a guide towards 
adopting integrated reporting, meaning making the reporting more efficient and focused on 
value creation, leading to better reader understanding, better capital allocation and a more 
sustainable economy (IIRC 2014a). The implementation of integrated reporting is therefore 
benefiting both business and investors (IIRC 2014i). 
 
The framework consists of seven guiding principles: Strategic focus and future orientation, 
Connectivity of information, Stakeholder relationship, Materiality, Conciseness, Reliability 
and Completeness, and Consistency and Comparability that should permeate the process and 
presentation of the integrated report (IIRC 2013b). Additionally, there are eight content 
elements: Organizational overview and External environment, Governance, Business model, 
                                               
2 The <IR> framework defines materiality as a matter that could substantively affect the organization’s 
ability to create value in the short, medium or long term (IIRC 2013b p.33).  
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Risks and Opportunities, Strategy and Resource allocation, Performance, Outlook, and Basis 
of preparation and presentation that should be included in the report. Each content element 
begins with a question in bold italic and all these questions should be answered in order to call 
the report an integrated report according to the <IR> framework (IIRC 2013b). For the content 
element governance the question is “How does the organization’s governance structure 
support its ability to create value in the short, medium and long term?” (IIRC 2013b p. 25). 
The question is followed by guidelines, which assist the user in answering the question. 
Throughout the framework it is stressed that the integrated report should explain how the 
organization creates value in the short, medium and long term (IIRC 2013b). 
2.1.3 Value creation  
While the meaning of value traditionally has been connected to changes in financial capital due 
to financial performance, IIRC (2013a) points out that value and value creation is dependent 
on a broader range of factors, both tangible and intangible. Value itself cannot be defined since 
the meaning of it is different for different people in different contexts (IIRC 2013c) and 
managers need to find and understand their company’s specific key drivers of value (Marr et 
al. 2004). What is possible to define, however, is the process of value creation even though 
there is no universally agreed definition of value creation or how it should be communicated.  
 
The IIRC (2013c p. 1) defines the process of value creation in its background paper as follows: 
“Value is created through an organization’s business model, which takes inputs from the 
capitals and transforms them through business activities and interactions to produce outputs 
and outcomes that, over the short, medium and long term, create or destroy value for the 
organization, its stakeholders, society and the environment.”  
 
The definition highlights that value creation should be recognized as a wider term than for the 
company only, meaning that when a company defines what value is for them they must also 
consider if value is created or destroyed for society at large. Porter and Kramer (2011) refer to 
it as shared value. The authors state that ignoring social needs will create internal costs for the 
company and eventually make it unsustainable. Thus the ability for the company to create value 
for itself is dependent on the value that is created for others.  
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Figure 1 The business model (IIRC 2011, p. 10) 
IIRC’s definition also states that the business model is the central vehicle in the value creation 
process and vital for how the company’s capitals are being managed. Figure 1 is taken from 
IIRC’s discussion paper and shows their interpretation of a business model. The capitals refer 
to the resources and relationships used and affected by the company and include financial, 
human, manufactured, intellectual, social and relationship, as well as natural capitals (IIRC 
2013b). The communication to stakeholders regarding these capitals and how the business 
model manages them is crucial for the level of confidence in the company’s value creation 
process. What is also important for the confidence is information regarding the governance 
structure since the structure has significant impact on a successful implementation of the 
business model (IIRC 2013c). Governance reporting is thereby of great interest to stakeholders 
since it provides insight in the company’s ability to create and sustain value (PwC 2013d; IIRC 
2013c).  
2.2 What is governance? 
Governance means steering and is necessary in all listed companies. The focus of this study is 
corporate governance and involves the structure necessary to monitor the company in the right 
direction (Kanagaretnam et al. 2007; Haniffa & Hudaib 2006; Cadbury report 1992). Corporate 
governance has been defined by Denis and McConnell (2003) as mechanisms that induce 
managers of the company to work in line with the interest of the owners, thereby maximizing 
the value for the owners.  These governance mechanisms can broadly be divided into two 
groups: external and internal. External mechanisms include for example the legal system (Denis 
& McConnell 2003). Examples of the internal mechanisms of governance, which are the focus 
of this thesis, include board structure variables (Haniffa & Hudaib 2006), incentive schemes 
(Donaldson & Davis 1991), the decision-making process, and the implementation of decisions 
taken (Abeysekera 2013). 
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In many organizations, especially public companies, where ownership and management are 
separated, the responsibility of the in-firm governance is given to the board of directors 
(Cadbury Report 1992). IIRC’s <IR> framework (2013b p. 33) defines those charged with 
governance as follows: “The person(s) or organization(s) (e.g., the board of directors or a 
corporate trustee) with responsibility for overseeing the strategic direction of an organization 
and its obligations with respect to accountability and stewardship.”  
 
The theoretical approach to corporate governance can be derived from the agency theory 
(Jensen & Meckling 1976; Eisenhardt 1989), which highlights the possibility of conflicts of 
interest between management of the firm and the shareholders of the firm when these positions 
are separated (Tariq & Abbas 2013). Furthermore, the agency theory has also been developed 
to include all stakeholders in the stakeholder-agency theory (Hill & Jones 1992). Similar to 
shareholders all type of stakeholders, for example customers, suppliers, and the society, have 
an interest in knowing that the company is in line with the interest of the stakeholders. The 
agency theory, therefore, suggests the implementation of a system with internal and external 
control mechanisms that direct and control the company (Tariq & Abbas 2013) and these 
control mechanisms are, as explained above, known as corporate governance (Haniffa & 
Hudaib 2006; Cadbury report 1992). 
 
When steering the company the board is responsible for making sure the interests of the 
managers are in line with those of the stakeholders (Frías-Aceituno et al. 2013), i.e. minimizing 
the agency problems by ensuring the business activities are congruent with the company’s 
strategy and that the management and employees know what to do and are capable of executing 
the strategy (Solomon 2010). Some definitions include management as part of those charged 
with governance, on the grounds that to be effective governance direction and control must 
exist throughout the company (Bloomfield 2013). This thesis defines those charged with 
governance in line with IIRC’s definition as the board of directors, which is also supported by 
others (Cadbury report 1992; Kollegiet 2010). In addition, the way the board of directors 
governs the company may in many cases include directing the management.  
2.3 The evolution towards integrated reporting  
Both the nature and the content of corporate reporting have changed. Historically, corporate 
reporting consisted of past financial information (Eccles & Krzus 2010), which basically just 
informed about profit and losses, assets and liabilities (A4S 2014). These financial reports were 
mainly addressing firms’ shareholders (Crowther 2002). While financial reporting goes back 
hundreds of years, matters of non-financial reporting only have a few decades of history 
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(Larsson 2009). In the 1970s, corporate reporting was extended to cover social aspects and, in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, environmental reporting evolved as a consequence of several 
accidents and disasters such as Chernobyl and Bhopal (Herzig & Schaltegger 2006).  
 
Today, a majority of the largest listed companies present a sustainability report (KPMG 2011), 
often with both social and environmental aspects combined. The amount of integrated reports 
are still limited but on the rise. South Africa is prominent in this area and, since 2010, the 
organizations listed on the Johannesburg stock exchange are required to present an integrated 
report (Integrated Reporting Committee of South Africa 2011). While financial reporting is 
mandatory for listed companies in Sweden, non-financial reporting is still mostly an 
unregulated area. Companies presenting information other than strictly financial mostly do it 
on a voluntary basis. Likewise the choice of producing an integrated report is voluntary. Below, 
major factors behind the development towards integrated reporting and why companies choose 
to be more transparent in their reporting than required by law are mapped. The reasons behind 
voluntary disclosures are numerous and extensive. Therefore, the main reasons behind this 
development are examined below.  
2.4 External drivers of change  
Since no company operates in isolation, the external environment has an impact on all 
organizations (Eccles & Krzus 2010). The society has for instance shifted towards a more 
knowledge-based economy (Lev & Daum 2004), where companies’ value creating assets are 
to a higher extent intangible3 (Eccles & Krzus 2010; IIRC 2013c). However, few of these are 
shown on the balance sheet (Eccles & Krzus 2010), which makes the importance of non-
financial reporting apparent since a true and fair view of the company cannot be displayed 
without this information (Krstić & Đorđević 2010).  
 
Globalization, rapid population growth, and increasing global consumption are other drivers of 
change and these are affecting the quality, price and above all the availability of resources (IIRC 
2011). This is closely linked to the well-established fact that planet earth is suffering due to 
pollution and the degradation of ecosystems. The result is an increasing awareness among 
stakeholders that to remain sustainable, companies must take these aspects into consideration. 
This is supported by Eccles, Krzus and Serafeim (2011) who state that the market’s interest in 
non-financial information, especially environmental information, is growing.  
 
                                               
3 Intangible assets include for example: employees’ competency, relationships, reputation and, the 
effectiveness of the organizations’ structure, production and, processes (Allee 2008). 
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According to the same authors, governance information, particularly board composition and 
board activity, is also of great interest to the market. The demand on businesses to include more 
information specifically on corporate governance as well as risk management and scenario 
planning (PwC 2011) partly has its foundation in the global financial crisis of 2008/2009, which 
resulted in a crisis of trust (Eccles & Krzus 2010). Two contributing factors to the crisis were 
the companies’ dominated short-term focus and a lack of long-term perspective in decision-
making (IIRC 2011). To avoid a recurrence of the crisis the solution is more corporate 
transparency (Jones & Thompson 2012; Eccles & Krzus 2010) since transparency helps build 
trust (IIRC 2011). One way is to inform about how the business of the companies performs and 
is governed in the light of these risk issues (PwC 2013c; PwC 2013b).   
 
The move towards more disclosures of non-financial information has been accompanied by 
numerous standards, principles and guidelines (Frías-Aceituno et al. 2014). Parallel to this 
development, the regulation regarding financial information has tightened and become more 
complex. Accounting standards of today are often difficult to interpret and companies are 
required to spend a lot of time and resources to produce their financial statements (Eccles & 
Krzus 2010). One major reason behind the more complex accounting standards is the growing 
financial market, which has resulted in advanced financial instruments including for example 
derivatives, hedges, swaps, securitizations and stock options (Eccles & Krzus 2010). The 
outcome includes an increase in the amount of information provided in the annual reports, but 
more information also makes it hard to use and understand. The growing amount of information 
in the annual reports is also due to the regulation regarding governance and governance 
disclosures, which is examined further below. Integrated reporting aims to increase the 
understandability of corporate reporting and make it concise, meaning decreasing the amount 
of information necessary for stakeholders when assessing the company (IIRC 2011). 
2.5 Internal drivers of change 
Although organizations are clearly affected by their external environment, major questions to 
answer are to whom they adapt and why?   
2.5.1 To whom do companies adapt? 
The stakeholder theory can be seen as one background factor for the development towards more 
non-financial disclosures. The Stakeholder theory was first presented by Freeman in 1984. The 
theory defines stakeholders as groups and individuals that affect or are affected by the 
organization, for example providers of capital, customers, suppliers, and communities 
(Freeman et al. 2010). The theory diverges from Friedman’s Shareholder value theory, which 
argues that a firm’s primary purpose is to maximize the value for shareholders and actions by 
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the firm should not be taken unless they generate profit (IIRC 2013c). The stakeholder theory, 
on the other hand, does not favor a particular group or individual since an organization interacts 
with and has obligations to various actors in society, not just their shareholders (Freeman et al. 
2010).  
 
Thus, the management of firms must keep the relationships with the different stakeholders in 
balance, otherwise the existence of the firm is threatened (Freeman 2001). The organizations 
will therefore make sure that the demand of those stakeholders that control vital resources are 
met (Deegan 2007), meaning both managing the effects of the business activities and producing 
external communication to the stakeholders (Herzig & Schaltegger 2006). As a result of 
organizations considering a wider group of stakeholders and a rising awareness and a growing 
demand for information among these stakeholders, the communication presented by the 
organizations has changed.  
2.5.2 Why do companies adapt?  
As mentioned above environmental reporting evolved as a consequence of several accidents 
and disasters such as Chernobyl and Bhopal. Companies were believed to be the major cause 
of environmental problems and as a consequence organizations started to inform about relevant 
activities related to the environment (Herzig & Schaltegger 2006). This phenomenon can be 
explained by the legitimacy theory, a theory on why companies choose to publish voluntary 
disclosures (Deegan 2007). The theory concludes that companies voluntarily disclose in order 
to legitimize themselves (Michelon & Parbonetti 2012; Cho & Patten 2007), meaning 
persuading the stakeholders that their interests are congruent with those of the company and 
are cared for and taken into account when forming the company’s strategy. This condition is 
called legitimacy (Lindblom 1994, see Wilmshurst & Frost 2000 p. 23) and is seen as a resource 
for the company (Mahadeo et al. 2011; Tilling & Tilt 2010). The effect of preserving legitimacy 
include gained support from society, in terms of for instance increased capital inflow, customer 
appreciation and labor participation (Mahadeo et al. 2011).   
 
Other incentives for the companies to produce voluntary disclosures include reduced 
information asymmetry and agency problems (Mallin & Ow-Yong 2012). Agency problems 
will be explained under the development of corporate governance reporting. The people in the 
company, the ones actually performing the business activities, have more information on how 
the activities affect the surrounding world than external stakeholders (Schaltegger 1997). This 
is called information asymmetry. The Nobel Prize winner Akerlof (1970) explains the outcomes 
of information asymmetry in his market for lemons theory. Products that are of good quality 
are driven out of the market by worse products if there is no information. This phenomenon is 
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known as adverse selection due to information asymmetry (Akerlof 1970). As the buyer cannot 
assess the quality of the product without information, he/she will not pay the price it deserves 
(Healy & Palepu 2001). This is also argued to lead to ineffective capital allocation (Mallin & 
Ow-Yong 2012).  
 
Companies can in the same manner communicate, through for example voluntary disclosures, 
in order to reduce investor uncertainty, providing information upon which valuations and 
decisions can be based (Meek et al. 1995). To exemplify, if an investor is choosing between 
two companies, he or she needs information in order to assess the companies. Without 
information, the unsustainable company A will look just as good as the sustainable B. B needs 
to convince the investor that his/her company is worth more than A. This can be done through 
corporate sustainability disclosures. The dilemma, however, is that A could produce dishonest 
information, forcing the investor to also assess the quality of the given information (Akerlof 
1970). This is elaborated below in the section on the development of corporate governance 
reporting. 
  
Since voluntary disclosures reduce information asymmetry, according to the Capital market 
transactions hypothesis, this motivates companies to produce voluntary disclosures as it 
reduces the cost of the firm’s external financing (Healy & Palepu 2001).  
2.6 Corporate governance reporting 
As this thesis concentrates on the area of governance within integrated reporting the 
development and importance of corporate governance reporting are explained below.  
2.6.1 Development of corporate governance reporting 
Several corporate scandals and corporate governance failures in the 1990/2000s due to fraud 
and insufficient systems of control have raised the question of the credibility of corporations 
and particularly the governance (Tariq & Abbas 2013; Larsson 2009). The financial crisis 
contributed to an increase in focus on corporate governance, mainly effective risk management 
and reporting practices (Ntim et al. 2013). One effect is that governance codes have grown in 
quantity around the world in recent decades (Abbas & Tariq 2013). The Swedish governance 
code exists to maintain good governance, i.e. to secure that the company is governed in a way 
that is consistent with the idea of the shareholders (Kollegiet 2010), thus minimizing the risk 
of agency problems. The code is a complement to legislation and not mandatory for listed 
companies to follow (Kollegiet 2010). However, when deviation is made from the guidelines 
in the code the company must motivate why and present the alternative, which concludes that 
some sort of corporate governance report must be produced. 
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The current state of Swedish corporate governance reports is that they live up to the 
requirements in the code to a large extent, but they sometimes lack the necessary details 
(Kollegiet 2010). They also tend to be quite generic, and remain the same from year to year 
(Lagerström4; PwC 2013a), but lately a trend towards more integrated corporate governance 
reports has been noted (PwC 2013b). The report should not be seen as a burden, it is an 
instrument for improving the governance and communication to stakeholders (PwC 2013b).  
 
The need for corporate governance reporting exists primarily in companies where the role of 
financer and manager are separated. The arguments for improved corporate governance 
reporting are supported by the agency theory and serve to reduce agency problems. Agency 
problems include the well-studied shareholders’ risk of managers leading the company into 
unattractive projects, in order to for example serve their own interests (Schleifer & Vishny 
1997). Good governance makes sure that the interests of the managers are in line with the 
owners, thereby the company is seen as less risky (Krafft et al. 2014) and investors are willing 
to pay a higher price (McKinsey 2002).  
 
Agency problems are not limited to the relationship between the firm and its shareholders. The 
stakeholder-agency theory recognizes the difference of interests between the firm and all its 
stakeholders (Hill & Jones 1992). As pointed out above, corporate governance is needed as a 
channel between stakeholders and managers (Buck et al. 1998). According to King III5 (IoDSA 
2009), the board is responsible for overseeing the management-stakeholder relationship. 
Corporate governance reporting has therefore been developed to assist stakeholders in the 
assessment of the quality of the governance, hopefully creating a feeling of trust towards those 
charged with governance. 
2.6.2 Importance of corporate governance reporting 
It can be concluded that stakeholders need information to make better decisions and that 
companies are favored by producing voluntary disclosures. Advantages include gained 
legitimacy and reduced information asymmetry and capital cost. In order to reach the 
advantages, however, the disclosures need to be credible (Akerlof 1970; Healy & Palepu 2001) 
and credibility is the most important capital of a company (Larsson 2009).  
 
                                               
4 Bo Lagerström, partner and specialist in corporate reporting at PwC, telephone interview February 11th 
2014. 
5 King III is the short name for the King Code of Governance Principles and the King Report on 
Governance issued by IoDSA, the Institute of Directors in South Africa (IoDSA 2014). Those companies 
listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange are obligated to comply with the King III (Solomon & 
Maroun 2012). 
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The disclosures on governance structure affect the reader’s view of the credibility of the entire 
set of disclosures, as it reflects the confidence of the company’s ability to create value through 
the business model, be transparent and disclose accurate information (IIRC 2013c). A study 
done by Byard, Li and Weintrop (2006) concluded that governance quality is positively 
correlated with the quality of analyst forecasts, signaling that companies with high governance 
quality produce more reliable and transparent information. According to the Global Investor 
Opinion Survey, more than 50 % of Western European and North American investors even 
consider governance more, or equally, essential as financial issues: i.e. profit performance and 
growth potential (McKinsey 2002). In the rest of the world the number is over 80 %. 
Furthermore, it is the management that usually determines the extent of disclosures (Deegan 
2007; Mallin & Ow-Yong 2012), and it is argued that the board has the role of monitoring the 
managers (Fama 1980). This further adds to the arguments that it is important to disclose 
information about the board and its actions.  
2.7 The need for integrated reporting 
One might ask why the existing financial reporting in combination with the increasing amount 
of non-financial information is not enough? Why is there still a gap between what companies 
communicate in their reports and what stakeholders want despite all the information available? 
 
Integrated reporting is the result of an increasing, market-led demand on corporate reporting 
(IIRC 2014a) since the information in the backward-focused financial reports are not enough 
according to the stakeholders (IIRC 2011; KPMG 2012). Evolution has resulted in an 
increasing awareness that an organization’s performance and value creation depends on a 
variety of factors that are not only financial but also non-financial factors, and thus not all 
shown on the balance sheet (1company 2013). The clear trend of today is to make more 
“Stakeholder-oriented reporting” and highlight factors such as sustainability and stakeholder 
commitment (Solomon & Maroun 2012). With a broader set of stakeholders recognized by the 
company, more information is disclosed voluntarily, on for example environmental and social 
issues (Hassan & Ibrahim 2012).  
 
Despite the fact that the traditional financial reports now are accompanied by a greater number 
of sustainability reports and other non-financial information, major disclosure gaps between 
companies and their stakeholders still remain (KPMG 2012). The attempt of organizations to 
gain legitimacy, reduce information asymmetry, and fulfill the several regulations, standards, 
general demands, and expectations regarding corporate reporting have led to voluminous, 
cluttered, complex, and disconnected reports that often are hard to interpret (Abeysekera 2013; 
IIRC 2011). Adapting to the different frameworks in isolation does not automatically result in 
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an interconnected report (Abeysekera 2013). The non-financial information is often presented 
separately with no connection to the rest of the reports, which makes it hard for the user to 
make an appropriate assessment of the company, thereby not meeting the demand of the 
stakeholders after all. The disclosures need to be understandable in order to reach the 
advantages known to come from disclosing (Schaltegger 1997). 
 
A new trend has therefore started to develop, where an integration of sustainability and 
governance information is asked for (Solomon & Maroun 2012; Herzig & Schaltegger 2006). 
Integrated reporting makes it easier for companies to concisely bring together the material 
information needed to communicate with stakeholders on how the company creates value in 
the short, medium and long term (IIRC 2011). Thus, the long-term perspective prevents 
organizations and investors from making impulsive, short-term decisions with perhaps only 
financial value creation in mind (KPMG 2012). 
 
In connection to the legitimacy theory one can ask whether the companies disclose simply to 
legitimize themselves or because they feel it is their responsibility to inform stakeholders 
(Deegan 2007). The latter would require the management to accept responsibility and 
accountability, since they tend to be the ones who can choose what to disclose and what to leave 
out (Deegan 2007; Mallin & Ow-Yong 2012). This would mean that nothing material could be 
left out simply because the stakeholders have not recognized that they are requesting the 
information.  
 
The IIRC recognizes the need to focus on communication rather than simply meeting legal 
requirements (IIRC 2011). An integrated report according to the IIRC is based on the business 
model and how this is affected by and affects the stakeholders as well as sustainably creates 
value (IIRC 2011). As Larsson (2009) describes in his book Hållbar affärsutveckling the goal 
is sustainability, which is defined as a world where resources are well preserved and not 
destroyed, whether it is economic, social, environmental or human resources. To be a 
sustainable company, the resources they are dependent on also need to be sustainable. 
2.8 Disincentives for the companies 
One disincentive connected to disclosures is the proprietary cost: for example the cost of 
disclosure and exposing company secrets to competitors (Frías-Aceituno et al. 2014; Mallin & 
Ow-Yong 2012). The cost of disclosure is argued to be seen as a minimal problem since this 
information has to be collected for internal use even if not externally disclosed (Frías-Aceituno 
et al. 2014). Preparing an integrated report also involves facing the challenge of materiality, 
deciding what to report (Massie 2010), and the company’s decision of what to include in the 
   
 24 
report demands thorough considerations (IIRC 2011). However, legal requirements may force 
companies to include non-material information. Zicari (2014) suggests that a distinction needs 
to be made between what is relevant information and what is only legal-compliance 
information, with the latter presented in an annex document.  
 
Eccles and Saltzman (2011) argue that an integrated report can raise the question of reliability 
since the audit of voluntary disclosures is not currently achieving the same rigor as the audit of 
financial reports. Furthermore, they state that many companies lack high-quality internal 
control systems for non-financial information. These circumstances will cost time and money 
for the companies but according to Eccles and Saltzman (2011) integrated reporting is the best 
alternative for corporate reporting on the path towards a sustainable society. 
2.9 GRI 
Since the Global Reporting Initiative’s (GRI) guidelines are used as inspiration when forming 
the questions in the scoring system a short explanation of who they are will be provided. GRI 
is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1997 with the mission to spread and improve 
sustainability reporting (GRI 2014a). They have produced guidelines for sustainability 
reporting since 2000 and the latest set, G4, was launched in 2013 (GRI 2014a). GRI’s guidelines 
are widely used all over the world and have become the standard for companies that produce 
sustainability reports (GRI 2014b). One of GRI’s current priorities is to develop integrated 
reporting and they are one of the co-founders of IIRC (GRI 2014c). 
2.10 Size as an explanatory factor 
The second research question concerns the possible relationship between compliance with the 
<IR> framework and the size of the company. Most of the previous research show that the 
amount of disclosures tends to increase with company size (e.g. Trotman & Bradey 1981; 
Belkaoui & Karpik 1989; Alnajjar 2000; Hahn & Kühnen 2013). One contributing factor is the 
greater need of larger firms for external financing, for which disclosures can be used as a signal 
to capital providers to help establish and maintain the relationship between the firm and the 
capital providers (Frías-Aceituno et al. 2014).  
 
Disclosures can also be used by the company to send out signals to other stakeholders in order 
to legitimize themselves and since larger companies often affect a wider range of stakeholders 
it contributes to an increased amount of disclosures (Hahn & Kühnen 2013; Orojali Zadeh & 
Eskandari 2012). From the perspective of agency theory there might be a higher risk of agency 
conflicts due to, for instance, larger firms’ greater need for external financing (Frías-Aceituno 
et al. 2014). Therefore, larger firms tend to disclose more to reduce information asymmetry. 
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This, together with the fact that corporate governance mechanisms exists to minimize the 
agency problems (Ho & Wong 2001), indicates that the larger the firm is, the more extensive 
governance mechanisms are required to control the agency problems. Specific disclosures of 
these corporate governance mechanisms and its structure are also known to minimize the 
agency conflicts (Mallin & Ow-Yong 2011).  
 
Lang and Lundholm (1993) highlight that disclosures increase with firm size since the cost of 
disclosing decreases with firm size. Singhvi and Desai (1971) agree with the motivation that 
the cost is lower since the information is more likely to have already been produced for internal 
use. Larger firms also tend to have more extensive systems for corporate information, which 
facilitates the information gathering (Depoers 2000). However, the study of Lang and 
Lundholm (1993) is also questioning if this is the case regarding the total cost of disclosure, 
meaning voluntary information included. Watson, Shrives and Marston (2002) argue that this 
is the case, mentioning that the proprietary costs are lower in large firms. Frías-Aceituno et al. 
(2014) on the other hand mention that these costs probably are independent of the size of the 
firm. Despite this the authors stress that; the larger the firm the greater the possible benefits are 
of preparing the information, mainly referring to the decreased agency costs.  
 
Prior research also concludes that larger firms face higher scrutiny by different stakeholders 
(Alnajjar 2000) and tend to be more exposed as they get more attention (Frías-Aceituno et al. 
2014). Therefore they have more users that demand information.  
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3. Methodology  
This chapter aims to explain how the study was performed. First, the motivations for this type 
of study are presented. This is followed by a presentation of the research design, including an 
explanation of the construction of the scoring system. Subsequently, the execution of the scoring 
system is presented and lastly what methods were used when analyzing the data.   
3.1 Background to the study 
The aim of this study is to assess how far Swedish listed companies have come in the process 
of implementing integrated reporting from the governance perspective. This can be evaluated 
using different approaches; examples include analysis of annual reports, interviews and 
surveys. The chosen method for this thesis is examinations of annual reports, as it is the annual 
reports that should be transformed into integrated reports. One advantage of analyzing annual 
reports is that they have long been considered the primary source of communication between a 
company and its stakeholders (Wiseman 1982; Eccles & Krzus 2010). In addition, it is a 
regularly produced report, which can easily be accessed (Wilmshurst & Frost 2000) and the 
credibility of the disclosures increases if presented in an annual report (Tilt 1994). Another 
advantage of analyzing annual reports compared to interviews is that a larger sample can be 
assessed. The study also aims to objectively measure the communication between companies 
and stakeholders through annual reports. Hence, the aim of the study is not to collect the 
subjective opinion of the companies, which would be the output of interviews. Furthermore, 
listed companies were chosen due to their greater need for transparency compared to private 
companies. Public companies are also found to disclose more and to be more transparent in 
order to establish and maintain a good relationship with investors (Frías-Aceituno et al. 2014).  
 
The <IR> framework was used as the basis when performing the study, as this aims to be an 
internationally accepted framework (IIRC 2011), and therefore what Swedish companies would 
read when transforming their annual report into an integrated report. Other frameworks on 
integrated reporting exist. However, in the development of the <IR> framework, the people and 
the organizations behind many similar frameworks or guidelines have participated; examples 
include Professor Mervyn King behind King III and the Global Reporting Initiative behind the 
GRI guidelines. Over 135 multi-national companies and investors are also participating in the 
IIRC pilot program (IIRC 2014f), which displays support from both preparers and users. The 
<IR> framework by IIRC can thereby be seen as the most internationally accepted framework 
for integrated reporting. Integrated reporting and IIRC was further explained in the frame of 
reference.  
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The study is limited to the <IR> framework’s content element governance. Only one content 
element was chosen in order to be able to focus on one area and fully explore it. Furthermore, 
this allows a larger sample, since the number of questions to assess is reduced, which enables 
more reliable conclusions to be drawn. The content element governance was chosen due to its 
essential and fundamental role for a company in its development towards integrated reporting. 
The role of the board of directors is crucial in the adoption of integrated reporting (Eccles & 
Krzus 2010). Furthermore, disclosures on governance and the governance structure are 
necessary to achieve the purpose of integrated reporting (Riche & Erasmus 2012). To reliably 
communicate how a company creates value it is necessary to include information regarding 
governance and its structure (IIRC 2013c). This is due to the fact that the governance has the 
responsibility to ensure that the company has the ability to sustain itself in the long-term (Eccles 
& Krzus 2010). To omit reporting on their structure and involvement will hamper the 
development towards integrated reporting (Riche & Erasmus 2012).  
3.2 Research design 
Integrated reporting is a fairly new concept, and even more so the <IR> framework. Therefore, 
as proposed by Blumberg, Cooper and Schindler (2011), a two-stage design of the study was 
chosen. During the first stage, the exploratory stage, the <IR> framework was interpreted to 
help develop definitions of the main concepts. An interview with Bo Lagerström6, who has led 
a similar study, was conducted as well. With the knowledge gained in this stage, a scoring 
system was created primarily based on the <IR> framework. More detailed information on the 
scoring system is found below in 3.2.1 and in appendix 1. The activities in this stage also created 
an understanding for integrated reporting, which is essential for conducting a reliable execution 
of the scoring system and analysis. 
 
The second stage, the formal stage, is characterized by clearly stated hypotheses or investigative 
questions (Blumberg et al. 2011). As the aim of this thesis was to find to what extent annual 
reports meet the guidelines of the <IR> framework, a descriptive approach was suitable in 
contrast to a causal one (Blumberg et al. 2011). To fulfill the purpose, annual reports were 
analyzed. The disclosures in the annual reports were assessed using content analysis. This 
method has been used in several previous studies to assess disclosures in annual reports 
(Guthrie & Abeysekera 2006). Content analysis consists of manual or automated coding, which 
means categorizing the content of for example a document (Blumberg et al. 2011) in order to 
draw replicable and valid conclusions from texts (Krippendorf 2004).  
 
                                               
6 Bo Lagerström, partner and specialist in corporate reporting at PwC, telephone interview February 11th 
2014. 
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The appropriateness of the source must be thoroughly assessed (Blumberg et al. 2011). As it is 
the similarity between today’s annual reports and an integrated report according to the IIRC 
that is being analyzed, the source of annual reports is given. The annual report is the only 
company information that has been studied, not the website, the sustainability report or other 
reports. This may be seen as a limitation as the information needed to comply with the <IR> 
framework may be disclosed elsewhere today. However, since the aim of integrated reporting 
is to comprise relevant information into one report, this study only assesses annual reports. The 
<IR> framework (IIRC 2013b) states that the integrated report, as a single document or 
distinguishable part of another report, should answer the question of how the governance 
structure supports the organization’s ability to create value.  
 
After finding the source, the coding procedure must be defined. Themes, i.e. what is searched 
for in the texts, can be found when going through the data or defined from the start (Blumberg 
et al. 2011). For this study a predetermined scoring system was constructed. The design of the 
scoring system is not intended to identify certain words or phrases, but to assess whether certain 
criteria are found in the text, as it allows the extent and specificity of the disclosures to be 
measured, meaning that the study reveals not just what is being reported on or how much but 
also if the disclosure contains enough details to inform the reader of how the ability to create 
value is enhanced. This has its similarities to what is referred to as an open perspective 
(Blumberg et al. 2011). The meaning behind the items of the scoring system needs to be fully 
understood by the researchers and defined in detail, as a general problem of an open content 
analysis is that what is discovered in the beginning has the risk to influence the continuation of 
the study (Blumberg et al. 2011). To avoid this, the assessments of a certain item were 
constantly compared to each other.  
3.2.1 The scoring system 
This section provides a description of the scoring system and states the motivations behind the 
structure. The full version of the scoring system is found in appendix 1. The items, or questions, 
of the scoring system are primarily based on the <IR> framework. The area of governance in 
the <IR> framework was broken down into operational questions with the help of prior studies 
on the subject (PwC 2013a; PwC 2013b), a report on what integrated reporting looks like by 
KPMG (2012) as well as the GRI-G4-guidelines. In order to get acquainted with the topic and 
type of study an interview was conducted with Bo Lagerström7, who led the PwC benchmark 
study.  
 
                                               
7 Bo Lagerström, partner and specialist in corporate reporting at PwC, telephone interview February 11th 
2014. 
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In order to find a suitable structure for the scoring system, previous studies with the aim of 
identifying corporate social responsibility disclosures using scoring systems were studied. The 
studies include Singhvi and Desai (1971), Buzby (1974), Wiseman (1982), Alnajjar (2000) and 
Wang, Song and Yao (2013). Buzby (1974) identifies three groups of questions for analyzing 
annual reports. One of these groups contains questions answering to what degree something is 
disclosed; step one a general comment and step two a specified text. All questions of this 
scoring system have this structure, assessing the annual reports by evaluating the degree of 
specificity. This type was chosen, as the aim of this thesis is to evaluate to what extent the <IR> 
framework is fulfilled in today’s annual reports. Wang, Song and Yao (2013) have used a 
similar structure for analyzing disclosures on corporate social responsibility, giving a score of 
zero if not disclosed, one if disclosed qualitatively without explanation and lastly two if 
disclosed in detail. There is no linear relationship between the points in the index; meaning that 
2p is not twice as important or good as 1p. 
 
The scoring system constructed for this study has the following structure:   
0p - Nothing mentioned  2p - Describes 
1p - Mentions   3p - Linkage to the ability to create value 
 
The content element governance in the <IR> framework (IIRC 2013b, paragraph 4.9) begins 
with the question: How does the organization’s governance structure support its ability to 
create value in the short, medium and long term? As explained under the heading The <IR> 
framework, the question, which has to be answered in the integrated report, is followed by 
guidelines, which help companies answer the question in bold. The area of governance includes 
seven guidelines, from now on called areas, upon which this scoring system is based. An eighth 
area, statement by the board of directors, was added, since this is a criterion connected to 
governance but situated in the beginning of the <IR> framework (IIRC 2013b, paragraph 1.20, 
see appendix 3).  
 
One of the seven areas under governance, area 5, was furthermore excluded. The <IR> 
framework states in the fifth area that it should be disclosed in an integrated report whether the 
governance practices exceed legal requirements. This area was excluded from the study due to 
the lack of explanatory information on the subject. It is unclear whether the companies should 
explicitly state what is done beyond legal requirements or not. Furthermore, a question arose 
concerning how to evaluate companies with different legal requirements. If it is desired that 
companies implement governance practices that exceed legal requirement to a large extent, 
companies in environments with low legal requirements can more easily go beyond them. This 
would not have been an issue in this study, since all companies work under the same legal 
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requirements, but it creates an uncertainty as to what the guideline is striving for. Therefore, as 
it is not clear what the question would contribute with, it was excluded.  
 
All areas do not have the same amount of questions in the scoring system due to the fact that 
every area does not have an equal number of dimensions. Neither will there be a comparison 
made between the different areas, which makes it irrelevant to have the same number of 
questions.  
 
Each question of the scoring system includes a justification for the question together with 
guidance of how to apply the specific question when reading annual reports (see appendix 1). 
In the justification section the background of and reasons for the question are explained. Most 
of the questions have their foundation in the <IR> framework. Several are also inspired by the 
GRI’s criteria included in the GRI-G4-guidelines, as these guidelines are more specific than 
the guidelines in the <IR> framework. In addition, one of the objectives with the GRI-G4 is to 
guide companies in the process of linking sustainability reporting and integrated reporting (GRI 
2013). Therefore, it is suitable as an inspiration for this scoring system. Inspiration was 
furthermore gathered from other reports such as King III and reports by PwC and KPMG. 
Examples of good integrated reporting according to IIRC, accessible in IIRC’s emerging 
integrated reporting database, are also presented in this section when available.  
 
The guidance section includes what to have in mind when applying the scoring system and 
specific examples of how to earn the points are given to clarify what is meant.  Common to all 
areas is that to receive a higher score the prior criteria must be fulfilled; meaning that one cannot 
receive 3p unless both 1p and 2p have been earned. When scoring the annual reports, many 
assessments had to be made. This was also a reason for including the guidance section, as the 
assessments may reduce the ability to successfully replicate the study, thereby being a threat to 
the reliability and validity of the study. Despite this guidance one cannot ignore the fact that 
the study includes assessments and that the results may be affected by these.  
 
A limitation with the scoring system is that it does not take materiality into account. The scoring 
system is based on the guidelines in the <IR> framework. These guidelines should help the 
company decide what to include when answering the question of how the governance structure 
support value creation. If disclosing information in line with one of the guidelines results in 
information that is not material, it should not be included. This is not considered when scoring 
the annual reports. All companies that for example do not mention anything about how 
innovation is supported receive 0p, despite the fact that the information for some companies 
may not have been material to include. Furthermore, it was not assessed whether the disclosures 
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are good or true, but simply if the companies disclose. For example, in question 6 it is not the 
aim to assess the quality or likelihood of success of the ways to support innovation, only what 
is disclosed. 
  
This study compares the annual reports of 2013 with the guidelines in the <IR> framework 
published in December 2013. This means that the companies that wanted to use the <IR> 
framework had not had a long time to understand and apply the framework. What should be 
noted, however, is that the guidelines in the area of governance have generally been the same 
since the publication of the consultation draft in April 2013. The fact that the <IR> framework 
is new makes it interesting to perform similar studies in the future to map the development.  
3.3 Execution of the scoring system 
When performing the study the annual report was first once read through, in order to get 
acquainted with the business model and strategy, as this is important to know when for example 
assessing the potential link to the ability to create value, i.e. receive 3p. Comments were added 
to the annual report when reading something that could be linked to a question in the scoring 
system. Secondly, a scoring table (see appendix 2) was filled out stating what score is earned 
by the report for each question in the scoring system. This was done using the guidance 
provided in the scoring system (see appendix 1). Step one and two were performed by two 
coders separately in order to achieve reliability (Guthire & Abeysekera 2006). As a third step 
the two coders’ scoring tables of a specific company were compared. If different scores were 
given, this question was thoroughly assessed again. Furthermore, to secure that the assessments 
were kept consistent, the first two evaluated annual reports were re-assessed at the end. 
3.4 The sample  
The sample consists of 21 annual reports from the financial year of 2013 and were chosen 
regardless of their attitude towards the <IR> framework, meaning the annual reports in the 
sample are not prepared in accordance with the <IR> framework. A list of the companies on 
the OMX Nordic Stockholm was exported to excel on the 24th of February 2014 and were 
thereafter randomly sorted8. The segments, large, mid and small cap, were kept separated in 
order to have a sample with an equal number of companies from the three segments.  
 
After the random sorting of the companies the first companies were chosen. If a company was 
chosen it was examined further using two factors. The factors were that the annual report had 
to be published before the 21st of March 2014 and that it had to be a Swedish company. The 
                                               
8 The companies were randomly sorted in excel through the following steps: given a random number - 
copy number column - paste special – values - sorted on these numbers starting with the smallest number. 
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sample consists of the top seven companies that fulfilled these two factors from each segment: 
large, mid and small cap. A list of the companies in the sample is provided in table 1. 
 
Small cap Mid cap Large cap 
Björn Borg Arcam Boliden 
Connecta Avanza Latour 
Dedicare Cloetta Saab 
Enea Gunnebo Scania 
Hemtex IFS SEB 
Naxs Mekonomen SKF 
Ortivus Öresund TeliaSonera 
  
Table 1: The companies in the sample 
 
When determining the sample size annual reports were added until reliable conclusions about 
size could be drawn. To find an appropriate sample size, the average score in each of the three 
segments9 were analyzed. To begin with, five annual reports from each segment were scored. 
Then a sixth annual report was added to each segment. It was pre-decided that if this changed 
the average score of the segment with more than one point another annual report was added in 
all segments, including those segments that fulfilled the criterion. The score of the seventh 
annual report changed the average score of small cap with 0.5p, mid cap 0.6p and large cap 
with 0.4p, see table 2. This meant the criterion of not changing the average score with more 
than one point was fulfilled.   
 
 Small cap Mid cap Large cap 
Average score before a seventh annual 
report was added to the sample 
10.2p 12.5p 18.5p 
Average score after a seventh annual 
report was added to the sample 
9.7p 13.1p 18.9p 
Change of average score 0.5p 0.6p 0.4p 
 
Table 2: Determination of sample size   
                                               
9 The total score of the companies in small, mid and large cap respectively divided by the number of 
companies in the sample in the segment. 
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3.5 Analysis of the collected data  
The aim of the analysis was to draw conclusions from the findings. To enable an effective 
analysis of the findings in the annual reports the scores from the scoring tables were gathered 
in a document. In some cases the annual reports were clustered into three groups depending on 
their score, 0-9 p, 10-19 p and 20-30 p. This was done in order to facilitate the analysis. When 
used, it was found to increase the understanding and significantly clarify the inferences.   
 
In previous studies, size has been found to be positively correlated with integrated reporting 
(Frías-Aceituno et al. 2014). Previously, Swedish studies on integrated reporting have, 
however, focused mostly on the largest companies, see for example PwC 2013a. Therefore, the 
results from this study were analyzed with size as an explanatory factor, in order to examine if 
large companies produce annual reports that are more in line with the <IR> framework in the 
area of governance. Firm size was measured by market capitalization since this is what 
determines if a company is listed on the small, mid or large cap. Companies with a market 
capitalization of less than EUR 150 million are listed on small cap. Mid cap are those companies 
with a market capitalization between EUR 150 million and EUR 1 billion. Those companies 
larger than EUR 1 billion are listed on the large cap (Nasdaq OMX 2013 p. 8).  
 
Determining the measurement for size is relevant for an analysis (Orojali Zadeh & Eskandari 
2012) and there are various ways of measuring firm size in addition to market capitalization; 
sales, total assets, turnover, and number of employees (Hahn & Kühnen 2013) to mention a 
few. Previous studies in the area of size as an explanatory factor of disclosures has shown that 
the choice of measurement can affect the result, meaning two different ways of measurement 
can give dissimilar results (Orojali Zadeh & Eskandari 2012). This indicates that the choice of 
measurement for size in this thesis might affect the result and should therefore be taken into 
account.   
 
When analyzing the data, signs of a relationship were observed between a question in the 
scoring system and the total score. In order to further test this relationship the data was 
statistically analysed using SPSS 10 . The same method was used to statistically test the 
relationship between the extent of compliance with the <IR> framework’s content element 
governance and the size of the company, as stated in research question two. Due to the rather 
small sample, the tests were executed using Fisher’s exact test in SPSS. A significance level of 
99 % was used. The p-value was calculated in order to find whether the relationship depended 
on chance or not. To test the type of relationship Spearman’s correlation test was used. For both 
                                               
10 SPSS is a software for statistical analysis.   
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tests the simulation Monte Carlo was used, since the tables are larger than 2x2. In these tests 
the clustered groups, 0-9p, 10-19p and 20-30p, were found very helpful as these reduced the 
number of rows. Instead of having one row for each possible score, the rows were decreased to 
three. The analysis of size was constructed as shown in table 3.  
 
 Small cap  Mid cap Large cap Total 
0-9 p     
10-19 p     
20-30 p     
Total     
 
Table 3: Example of table for analysis 
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4. Empirical results and analysis  
In this chapter the empirical results from the study are presented together with an analysis of 
the findings. The chapter is structured by the two research questions. First, the findings 
regarding the extent to which Swedish listed companies comply with the <IR> framework’s 
content element governance are presented and analyzed. This section contains three parts: 
overall findings and analysis, a presentation of the company with the highest and lowest score 
together with possible explanations for this, and an outline regarding the results divided by the 
ten questions in the scoring system. Subsequently, the second research question, concerning 
the possible relationship between the results of the study and the size of the company, is 
presented and analyzed.   
4.1 Extent of compliance with the <IR> framework 
The 21 annual reports in the sample were assessed and scored using the scoring system 
presented in appendix 1. The scoring system contains a total of ten questions. For each annual 
report and each question a score from 0 to 3 was given, meaning a company could receive a 
maximum of 30 p. Table 4 summarizes the total scores of the 21 companies in the sample. In 
chart 1 the scores per company are presented. This chart also shows the distribution of the 
scores within the intervals in table 4. 
 
Score Number of companies Percentage of companies 
0-9 p 5  24 % 
10-19 p  12 57% 
20-30 p 4 19 % 
Total 21 100 % 
Average score 13,9p  
Mode score 12p and 14p  
Maximum score 30p  
 
Table 4: Summary of the scores 
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Chart 1: Scores per company 
 
Table 4 highlights that companies to a large extent received 10-19p. More specifically, the most 
frequently occurring score, the mode score, was 12p and 14p. In the range between 12p and 
14p, eight companies were found representing 38% of the sample. The general characteristic 
of these annual reports was that they mentioned the majority of the aspects in the <IR> 
framework’s area governance, i.e. received 1p. Furthermore, they generally received 3p in one 
or two questions and the same amount of 0p. It can be concluded that the majority of the annual 
reports include something related to all guidelines found in the <IR> framework’s area 
governance. However, the companies have several areas that need to be improved and described 
better before fulfilling the guidelines and answering the question of how the governance 
structure supports value creation.  
 
Given the importance of governance disclosures and the advantages of producing an integrated 
report, as presented in the frame of reference, companies should consider improving their 
disclosures on governance and its structure. The cost of disclosing would not rise, at least not 
substantially, as they already have to produce part of the information for internal use (Frías-
Aceituno et al. 2014) and are required by the Swedish corporate governance code to issue some 
sort of corporate governance report.   
 
Furthermore, since a broad set of stakeholders have been taking part in the development of the 
<IR> framework it can be seen as representing what information stakeholders are demanding. 
Thus, if the annual reports of the companies are not in line with the <IR> framework, a gap 
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between what stakeholders demand and what the companies provide may still exist. In addition, 
previous studies reveal for example that by improving the governance disclosures the company 
enhances the credibility of the entire report and creates confidence in the expressed future 
actions. It should also be mentioned that integrated reporting has been argued to enhance the 
efficiency of the entire company (Lennartsson 2014), which should further motivate companies 
to implement integrated reporting.   
 
Worth mentioning is also that the impression was that some companies had very good annual 
reports with well-described, transparent and non-generic disclosures with the exception of the 
corporate governance report. This indicates that Swedish companies might have come further 
along in the <IR> adoption process as a whole than this study, focused on governance, 
indicates. The two most apparent examples of the phenomenon were SKF and Scania. The 
beginning of the annual reports, where for example the business model and culture are 
presented, was well described with links to value creation. However, when reaching the 
corporate governance report, where most of the information to answer the questions in this 
scoring system can be found, the text became generic and short. Not much more than required 
by the Swedish corporate governance code was disclosed. This finding supports the conclusion 
in PwC’s benchmark study (PwC 2013a) that governance is the least well-reported area.  
 
4.1.1 Highest score – TeliaSonera 
One of the contributions of this thesis is to find examples of good ways of reporting on 
governance, since no best practice on integrated reporting has yet been established but is a way 
to enhance the implementation (Lennartsson 2013). The company receiving the highest score 
was TeliaSonera and therefore their score will be commented per question to further increase 
the understandability of how to report on governance according to the scoring system of this 
thesis. TeliaSonera, with a total of 25p, received 3p in six out of ten questions. In those 
questions where TeliaSonera failed to reach the highest point, an example of another company 
will be provided when available.  
4.1.1.1 Good examples per question 
In question 1a, concerning the composition of the board, TeliaSonera received 2p. None of the 
companies in the sample earned 3p in this question. Similar to all companies that received 2p, 
TeliaSonera earned their points by disclosing a table in the notes where the gender distribution 
of the board is stated. However, there exists significant room for improvement concerning this 
question. An easy improvement would be to include the gender distribution in the corporate 
governance report instead of in the notes, where it is easier to overlook. Furthermore, additional 
factors of diversity could be highlighted. 3p would have been earned if, for instance, an 
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explanation of how the different members of the board contribute with needed knowledge had 
been included. 
 
In question 1b, concerning the nomination committee, TeliaSonera was one of two companies 
in the sample to receive 3p. The strategy of their nomination committee is transparent and well 
described with linkage to the overall strategy of TeliaSonera. This is apparent in the description 
of how the nomination committee receives relevant information about the strategic direction of 
the company and how they, based on that information, assess what competences are necessary 
on the board. 
 
In question 2a, concerning the strategic decision-making process, TeliaSonera was one of four 
companies to receive 3p. In the corporate governance report, TeliaSonera includes an 
explanation of their governance framework and how they decide on what to achieve. Detailed 
descriptions of the responsibilities and the tasks of the board and the committees are included 
as well as an extensive explanation of the board’s annual work cycle. Overall this highly 
contributes to insight into the strategic decision-making process.  
   
Question 2b, concerning specific processes used to establish and monitor the culture of the 
company, is the question where the most companies received 3p, namely 12 companies out of 
the 21 companies in the sample. Among those was TeliaSonera. In their corporate governance 
report they describe their code of ethics and conduct and how the employees take part of it 
through an e-learning tool. The linkage to value creation is evident since the code of ethics and 
conduct is included in TeliaSonera’s governance framework, which describes the governance 
structure’s role in the value creation process.  
 
In question 3a, concerning the board’s strategic activities during the year, TeliaSonera was one 
of seven companies to receive 3p. The chairman of the board introduces the corporate 
governance report and talks about the priority areas of the board during the year with specific 
actions taken and why. Further down in the corporate governance report they continue to 
mention several, non-generic strategic actions taken by the board. Some of these specific 
actions are discussed in detail and connected to the strategy in other parts of the annual report.   
  
In question 3b, concerning the board’s risk-management related activities during the year, four 
companies received 3p and TeliaSonera was one of them. In their corporate governance report 
they give several examples of actions taken by the board to influence risk management and why 
they are taken. They mention the implementation of risk catalogues as a strategic action as well 
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as actions taken to review the overall sustainability risks. The latter includes the implementation 
of a new ethics and compliance function.  
 
In question 4, concerning the reflection of culture when using and affecting the capitals, 
TeliaSonera was one of 11 companies to receive 3p. In the structure of TeliaSonera’s 
governance framework, which is thoroughly explained in their corporate governance report, 
values and other boundaries for how to act are included.  The surrounding text clearly elaborates 
on the values and ethics, and actual examples of how for instance the values have influenced 
the actions are included. 
 
In the area of promoting and enabling innovation, question 6, TeliaSonera only received 1p. 
An example from Saab’s annual report of 2013 will therefore be provided since they were one 
of two companies receiving 3p. In the beginning of the annual report, the chairman of the board 
talks about the importance of innovation and what is done to enhance innovation. Even if the 
chairman does not explicitly mention what the board has done, the fact that he mentions what 
the company is doing to support innovation signals involvement and support from the board. 
Saab also links innovation to value creation by including innovation in the strategy. 
 
TeliaSonera did not manage to reach 3p in question 7, concerning remuneration and incentives, 
either. Instead Mekonomen is included as an example since they received 3p together with two 
other companies. Mekonomen states the importance of ensuring the linkage between 
remuneration and goals, both in the short and long term, as well as values of the company, see 
figure 13 in appendix 1. This is a clear example of a linkage to value creation.  
 
In question 8, concerning statement by the board of directors, none of the companies received 
3p. This was not surprising since none of the companies have stated that they produce an 
integrated report in accordance with the <IR> framework. However, TeliaSonera was one of 
five companies to receive 2p, meaning they have included a statement by the board introducing 
the corporate governance report. 
4.1.1.2 Possible explanations behind the high score 
The review in the section above highlights the importance of a transparent and non-generic 
annual report in order to answer the questions of this thesis’ scoring system. Especially the 
significance of a transparent and non-generic corporate governance report is prominent since 
this greatly contributes to a high score. As mentioned above, TeliaSonera was the company 
receiving the highest score in this study. However, in connection to TeliaSonera it is worth 
mentioning that they have had major governance changes during the year due to the corruption 
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scandal of 2012. TeliaSonera needs to disclose these changes, otherwise the stakeholders 
cannot assess the quality of the company properly. Hence, in order to differentiate oneself from 
other companies, i.e. reduce the information asymmetry, disclosures of these changes are 
necessary. Thus, the high quality of the governance disclosures is clearly important for 
TeliaSonera, which could explain their high score. 
 
Furthermore, it is interesting to relate the high score of TeliaSonera to the legitimacy theory. 
Their high score in this study indicates that they try to regain the legitimacy among their 
stakeholders, which was lost in the corruption scandal, since disclosures are a way of achieving 
this. Reasons for this search for legitimacy include the desire to increase capital inflow, 
customer appreciation, and labor participation (Mahadeo et al. 2011). The disclosures also need 
to be credible (Akerlof 1970; Healy & Palepu 2001) to help repair the conflict of trust. The 
high score of TeliaSonera might indicate that they have noted that disclosures on governance 
structure affect the reader’s view of the credibility of the entire set of disclosures and the value 
creation process (IIRC 2013c).  
 
The result of TeliaSonera can also be related to the stakeholder theory. Corruption scandals are 
not accepted by society and TeliaSonera’s high score in this study might indicate that they 
consider a broad range of stakeholders instead of only the shareholders. This is evident in the 
annual report where it is stated that the CEO has implemented a program to regain the 
confidence of their stakeholders (TeliaSonera 2013). This statement also contributes to creating 
confidence among the stakeholders that the company is working in line with the interest of the 
stakeholders, i.e. the statement reduces the risk of agency conflicts according to the 
stakeholder-agency theory. Worth mentioning is also that the scandal might not have been 
discovered if TeliaSonera had been a smaller company, since the attention and scrutiny from 
stakeholders increase with size.  
4.1.2 Lowest score - Naxs 
The company receiving the lowest score was Naxs. In over half of the questions 0p was 
received, meaning Naxs fails to disclose information in several areas. Naxs is an investment 
bank and when analyzing the data investment banks were found to receive low scores. A small 
analysis regarding sector was therefore conducted. As the sample of this study is rather small 
all sectors are not represented and in several sectors there are only one or two companies. Thus, 
it was not possible to perform an appropriate analysis with sector as a possible explanatory 
factor for integrated reporting. However, an indication of investment banks receiving low 
scores was found.  
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In the sample there are three investment banks, one in each segment. The investment bank in 
small cap, Naxs, received 5p, which is the lowest overall score. The investment bank in mid 
cap received 7p, which is the second lowest overall score. The third investment bank is listed 
on large cap and received 15p, which is an average overall score. Thus, this study indicates that 
investment banks to a lower extent produce reports similar to integrated reports. This thesis 
does not aim to find explanations to why this is the case. However, worth mentioning is that 
these investment banks have few employees, which could have a connection with why the 
annual reports contain nothing or very little about the culture of the organization. On the other 
hand, Naxs has contractual personnel and these might need values in order to work in line with 
the strategy of the company. How these values are implemented might in that case be even 
more important if the personnel turnover is high. This indicates that Naxs at least has a couple 
of areas that need improvements. 
4.1.3 Materiality as a limitation 
The fact that TeliaSonera provides extensive governance disclosures and Naxs does not, 
provides a concern towards the fact that materiality was not taken into account in the study and 
might be a limitation. What is material for one company might not be material for another. 
TeliaSonera clearly has a lot of information that is material and therefore needs to be disclosed.  
For other companies, such as Naxs, all questions in the scoring system might not need to be 
answered with a link to value creation in order to answer the main question, how those charged 
with governance support value creation. If this is the case they might still be in line with the 
<IR> framework even if they do not receive a high score in this scoring system. However, the 
conclusion of this study is still that several improvements are necessary for Swedish listed 
companies, with Naxs as a prominent example, in order to enhance the understandability of 
governance and its structure. The issue of materiality is further explored below, in relation to 
the discussion of size as an explanatory factor of governance disclosures. 
4.1.4 Results divided by question 
Table 5 summarizes the scores per question in the scoring system. This table also indicates that 
there is a wide range in the quality of the annual reports’ governance disclosures. On average 
25 % of the annual reports received 0p. Just a few percent fewer, 21 % of the companies, 
received 3p, which is also the percentage for 2p. The most commonly received score, 33 % of 
the annual reports on average, was 1p. This generalization, however, is not the best way to look 
at the results as these vary greatly from question to question. Therefore, the results per question 
will be described below. An analysis of why certain questions were better reported than others 
is not within the scope of this study and will therefore not be provided.  
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Question 0p 1p 2p 3p Average  
1a 0 (0 %) 3 (14 %) 18 (86 %) 0 (0 %) 1,9 
1b 19 (90 %) 0 (0 %) 0 (0 %) 2 (10 %) 0,3 
2a 0 (0 %) 12 (57 %) 5 (24 %) 4 (19 %) 1,6 
2b 4 (19 %) 4 (19 %) 1 (5 %) 12 (57 %) 2,0 
3a 0 (0 %) 14 (67 %) 0 (0 %) 7 (33 %) 1,7 
3b 3 (14 %) 12 (57 %) 2 (10 %) 4 (19%) 1,3 
4 4 (19 %) 5 (24 %) 1 (5 %) 11 (52 %) 1,9 
6 8 (38 %) 11 (52%) 0 (0 %) 2 (10 %) 0,8 
7 0 (0 %) 6 (29 %) 12 (57 %) 3 (14 %) 1,9 
8 14 (67 %) 2 (10 %) 5 (24 %) 0 (0 %) 0,6 
Average 5,2 (25 %) 6,9 (33 %) 4,4 (21 %) 4,5 (21 %)  
 
Table 5: Number (%) of companies receiving 0p, 1p, 2p or 3p divided by question 
 
The main finding from table 5 concerns question 1b, the nomination process. This was the area 
least well reported. The vast majority mentioned nothing on why members of the board were 
chosen. The aim of this study is not to provide possible explanations for why certain areas are 
well or not well reported on. However, it should be highlighted that this question is not 
explicitly mentioned in the <IR> framework, but was included in this scoring system since the 
issue of poor nomination process reporting was discussed in PwC’s study Bästa 
bolagsstyrningsrapportering 2012 (PwC 2013b). This thesis therefore supports PwC’s finding 
that disclosures on the strategy of the nomination committee need to be improved.  
 
In contrast, question 2b, the process for establishing and monitoring the culture of the 
organization, and question 4, the reflection of culture when using and affecting the capitals, 
were well described in the annual reports. Half of the companies even received 3p, meaning 
they explained how the desired or current culture would create value or help the organization 
reach their goals.  
 
Question 1a, composition of the board, and question 7, remuneration and incentives, were also 
well disclosed. In comparison to question 2b and 4, however, these questions’ relatively high 
average scores were obtained by a vast majority of companies receiving 2p in these areas. This 
implies that the companies provide descriptions of the areas but fail when it comes to linking 
the provided information to value creation.  
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The poor reported questions 6 and 8 are also worth mentioning. Concerning question 6, 
promotion and enabling of innovation, only two companies, representing 10 % of the total, 
received a score higher than 1p, meaning 90 % of the companies did not mention how the board 
helps support, promote or enable innovation. A frequent way was to explain how innovation 
was supported in the organization, sometimes very thoroughly, but no description of what the 
board does in the process was provided. This issue was also evident concerning question 3b, 
the board’s risk management related activities during the year.   
 
Question 8, statement by the board, was the second least well reported area, after the 
nomination process. Two thirds of the companies had not included a statement by the board in 
the annual report and no company received 3p. From this it can be concluded that no company 
produces an integrated report following the <IR> framework, as the statement is stated as a 
requirement.  
 
4.1.4.1 Relationship between the result and the existence of a statement by the board.  
In relation to question 8, an interesting indication of a relationship was found when analyzing 
the data. Table 6 shows the result from the study divided by those annual reports with a 
statement by the board and those without. All annual reports with a score of 20p or higher had 
a statement. In addition, all companies with a score of 9p or lower did not have a statement by 
the board. This indicates that companies that choose to include a statement by the board in the 
annual report are further along in the <IR> implementation process, i.e. better answer the 
question of how the governance structure supports value creation. One reason might be that a 
statement by the board brings transparency and credibility to the annual report. In addition, the 
statements are rarely generically written, thereby giving insights into the work and priorities of 
the board during the year.  
 
 Without statement With statement Total 
0-9 p 5 0 5 
10-19 p 9 3 12 
20-30 p 0 4 4 
Total 14 7 21 
 
Table 6: Results divided by existence of a statement by the board 
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A statistical analysis was performed to see if the relationship depended on chance or not. This 
was done using Fisher’s exact test with a significance level of 99%. The p-value was found to 
be 0.004, meaning the risk that the relationship was established by chance is 0.4 %.  
4.2 Size as an explanatory factor 
Table 7 shows the observed results from the study divided by size. This study found a positive 
relationship between the extent of compliance with the <IR> framework’s content element 
governance and the size of the company, meaning the larger the company is, the more the 
annual report of the company complies with the <IR> framework’s content element 
governance. To substantiate the observed relationship a statistical analysis was conducted. 
Using Fisher’s exact test the p-value was calculated to 0.006, meaning the risk that this 
relationship is established by chance is 0.6%. Further the type of relationship was tested using 
Spearman’s correlation test. This test showed a significant positive relationship; the value of 
the Spearman correlation was 0.713 and the value of the significance was 0.001. This 
relationship has, as described in the frame of reference, been established before mainly 
concerning voluntary and corporate social responsibility disclosures (Trotman & Bradey 1981; 
Belkaoui & Karpik 1989; Alnajjar 2000; Hahn & Kühnen 2013), but also lately integrated 
reporting (Frías-Aceituno et al. 2014).  
 
 Small cap Mid cap Large cap Total 
0-9 p 4 1 0 5 
10-19 p 3 6 3 12 
20-30 p 0 0 4 4 
Total 7 7 7 21 
 
Table 7: Results divided by size of the company 
 
One reason for this positive relationship may be larger firms greater need for external financing 
(Frías-Aceituno et al. 2014). The capital market transactions hypothesis states that disclosures 
decrease companies’ cost of external financing. Hence, a company with greater need for 
external financing has more to gain from disclosing. Furthermore, the agency theory can 
explain the findings. The sample of this thesis consists of listed companies, where there is a 
higher risk for agency conflicts compared to private companies, as agency conflicts occur when 
the role of management and the role of financier are separated. This theory has also been 
expanded to include all stakeholders, not just the shareholders. Larger companies tend to have 
larger impact on the society, meaning they have more stakeholders. Thus, larger companies are 
in greater risk of agency conflicts and have therefore greater need for disclosing regarding 
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governance, since those charged with governance are responsible for making sure that the 
company is managed in line with the stakeholders’ interests.  
 
The discussion above concludes that the larger the firm, the higher the risk of agency conflicts. 
It is also known that corporate governance mechanisms exists in order to minimize the agency 
conflicts. Therefore, it can be presumed that the larger the firm, the more extensive the 
governance mechanisms are required to be to control the agency conflicts. Hence, a natural 
consequence is that more information is available on the structure of these mechanisms, which 
in turn can affect the amount of disclosures presented by the company. Previous studies are 
divided in the opinion if the cost of the disclosures decreases with size. However, if this is true 
it is an additional explanation to why larger firms are more in line with the <IR> framework’s 
content element governance. 
4.2.1 Discussion on two issues with the study  
This study concludes that the relationship between voluntary disclosures and size, found in 
several previous studies, is also true regarding the specific area of governance within integrated 
reporting. However, two issues should be discussed in relation to this, which could be seen as 
limitations. Earlier the limitation of materiality was raised and in the previous paragraph larger 
companies’ need of more extensive governance mechanisms was explained. These two issues 
could mean that smaller companies are not supposed to earn as high scores as large companies 
in this scoring system as they do not need these large-scale governance structures as for 
example TeliaSonera do. This is probably to some extent true. Materiality was not possible to 
take into account, as this is information that only the companies possess. The result from this 
may be that some companies have received lower scores than they deserve with regard to how 
well they actually meet the guidelines in the framework. This issue could, however, occur for 
companies of all sizes.  
 
The second issue, concerning the existence of more extensive governance mechanisms in larger 
companies, on the other hand, should not be seen as a limitation to the study. The goal of the 
<IR> framework is to help display the value creation process and regardless the size of the 
company value needs to be created. Therefore, the scoring system of this thesis was not 
designed in a way that more disclosures from the companies meant higher score, although 
details were of course sometimes necessary. The focus was on whether the support of the value 
creation process was disclosed. When a smaller company explained why they for example did 
not have a remuneration committee it did not hamper their ability to reach a higher score and 
perhaps the board of a smaller company would not need as many pages as a larger one to explain 
what they have done during the year and why, but it should just as well be described. Therefore 
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this study indicates that the reason for larger companies’ higher scores, meaning better 
compliance with the <IR> framework’s content element governance, can be explained by the 
fact that larger companies have more to gain and not because they have more extensive 
governance mechanisms.  
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5. Conclusions 
This chapter presents the main findings and conclusions from the performed study. When doing 
so the purpose of the thesis is fulfilled. At the end of the chapter suggestions for further research 
on the area are presented.   
5.1 Main findings and conclusions 
From this study it can be concluded that governance disclosures should be improved in order 
to fulfill the guidelines in the <IR> framework content element governance. The most 
frequently occurring scores were 12p and 14p out of the maximum of 30p, meaning the majority 
of the studied companies mention the different aspects presented in the <IR> framework’s 
content element governance. However, on several areas the descriptions are too short and 
generic resulting in an insufficient amount of information to answer how those charged with 
governance support the organization’s ability to create value. Without this being answered the 
annual report is not in line with the <IR> framework.  
 
Even though the results of the study show that the area of governance is poorly reported, no 
conclusion can be drawn about the extent to which Swedish listed companies comply with the 
<IR> framework as a whole. However, the impression of some of the annual reports in this 
study was that they presented well-described, transparent and non-generic disclosures with the 
exception of the area of governance. The two most apparent examples of this phenomenon were 
SKF and Scania. This indicates that Swedish companies might have come further along in the 
<IR> adoption process as a whole than this study, focused on governance, indicates. 
 
In contrast to the main finding, that governance disclosures needs to be improved, 
TeliaSonera’s annual report of 2013 was found to comply with the <IR> framework to a large 
extent. In order to show companies favorable ways of disclosing on governance, examples of 
how TeliaSonera received their high score was provided. This is needed due to the fact that best 
practice has not yet been developed regarding integrated reporting. The high score of 
TeliaSonera was also found to possibly be explained by, for example, the legitimacy theory, as 
TeliaSonera is recovering from a major corruption scandal and need to regain the trust of the 
stakeholders.  
 
With regard to the more specific findings on the extent of compliance with the <IR> framework, 
great variations were found between the questions in the scoring system. In question 2b, the 
process for establishing and monitoring the culture of the organization, 57% received 3p. In 
contrast, 90% of the companies received 0p in question 1b, the nomination process. One reason 
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for including question 1b in the scoring system was the fact that a previous study (PwC 2013b) 
found the disclosures on the strategy of the nomination committee in great need of 
improvement. Thus, this study supports this need of improvement.  
 
A general finding when conducting the study, was the fact that a lot of information was generic 
and in regard to many aspects the responsibility taken or work done by those charged with 
governance was not disclosed. Examples of this include question 3b, concerning the board’s 
risk management related activities during the year, and question 6, promotion and enabling of 
innovation. Companies often failed to receive higher scores due to their lack of information on 
what the board of directors does regarding these issues. Furthermore, it was found that these 
problems often were reduced when a statement by the board was included in the report. These 
statements were often very informative, explaining the role and responsibility of those charged 
with governance as well as giving specific examples of the work done and the focus of the 
board during the year. A statistical analysis was conducted to ensure the observed relationship 
between the existence of a statement by the board and the extent of compliance with the <IR> 
framework regarding governance. The analysis showed a significant relationship.  
 
Regarding the second research question a significant positive relationship between the extent 
of compliance with the <IR> framework’s content element governance and the size of the 
company was found. The relationship was established with a p-value of 0.006, meaning the risk 
that this relationship is established by chance is very low, less than 1%. The result is consistent 
with previous studies in the area of company size as an explanatory factor of voluntary 
disclosures as well as corporate governance disclosures. Possible explanations for this 
relationship include larger company’s need for external financing and higher risk for agency 
conflicts.  
 
To summarize, this study highlights the importance of corporate governance disclosures as a 
relevant factor for a company to consider in a world where stakeholders demand more 
information of the value creation process of the company. The result of the study indicates that 
listed companies in Sweden have large room for improvements regarding governance 
disclosures. These two factors leads to the overall conclusion of this thesis, that Swedish listed 
companies should focus more on governance reporting.  
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5.2 Implications for further research 
When conducting this study many interesting questions outside the scope of this thesis were 
found. Since the <IR> framework is fairly new, it is an exciting area to study and also in great 
need of further research. Four suggestions for further research are stated below. 
 
1. The <IR> framework was published in December 2013, meaning the companies are just 
starting to be able to produce reports in line with this framework. A longitudinal study would 
therefore be interesting to conduct in a couple of years to map the changes of annual reports, if 
there are any.  
 
2. In addition, it would be interesting to perform similar studies as this one but on other content 
elements of the <IR> framework, since it was noticed when conducting this study that the 
corporate governance report in some cases was of lower quality than the rest of the annual 
report. This indicates that companies might be better in line with the <IR> framework regarding 
other content elements than governance. If this were the case an explanation for why would be 
interesting to find.  
 
3. Furthermore, since an explanation for why certain questions in the scoring system were well 
reported and others poorly was not in the scope of this study, a study investigating this would 
be of interest.  
 
4. Lastly, this study found an indication that companies in the investment bank sector poorly 
report in accordance with the <IR> framework’s content element governance. However, the 
sample of the study was too small to ensure whether sector affects the amount of disclosures 
on governance. Therefore, a similar study but with a sample large enough for the variable sector 
to be analyzed as an explanatory factor for corporate governance disclosures, would be of 
interest.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 - The scoring system 
 
The scoring system has the following structure:   
Question 
0p - Nothing mentioned  2p - Describes 
1p - Mentions   3p - Linkage to the ability to create value 
 
Justification 
Guidance 
Area 1: Board structure 
1a) Composition of the board 
0p - Nothing mentioned 
1p - Mentions the characteristics of the board. 
2p - Describes with a text/info-graphics the diversity and/or gender equality of the current 
board. 
3p - Linkage to the ability to create value. There is a discussion on why the board has the 
chosen composition and how it is linked to the business model. 
 
Justification: 
It appears from the <IR> framework (2013b) that the structure, including skills and diversity, 
of those charged with governance should be provided in the report. The report should also 
explain how it is linked to the organization’s ability to create value. The GRI-G4 (2013) 
provides guidelines, including that the governance structure should be reported on and 
characteristics such as gender and competences relating to economic, environmental, and social 
impacts should be disclosed. KPMG (2012) reports on what an integrated report should look 
like. In the area of governance KPMG states that the report should explain the logic behind the 
composition of the board and how it is linked to the organization’s business model. This 
supports the criterion for 3p. This question is furthermore important since companies that 
recognize diversity as a desired component of the board composition, are found to provide more 
voluntary holistic information and have closer stakeholder engagement (Frías-Aceituno et al. 
2013).  
 
 
 
   
 65 
 
Guidance:  
To earn 1p a description of the board members must be included in the annual report. Relevant 
information is for example education, experience and other board membership. This can often 
be found in the corporate governance report. To receive 2p the diversity of the current board 
should be highlighted. The IIRC points out the Crown Estate as a good example since they use 
info-graphics to show diversity (IIRC 2014j). What is important is that the information should 
reflect the diversity of the current board; hence a generic text is not enough. This type of 
information might be found as a table in the notes. For 3p a deeper discussion must be provided 
stating the link between the composition of the board and the organization’s business model. 
An example of this would be to explain how the different members of the board contribute with 
needed knowledge. 
 
1b) Nomination process 
0p - Nothing mentioned about the characteristics behind the nomination process of the board. 
1p - Mentions that some sort of diversity is one of the goals when choosing new board members. 
2p - Describes what kind of diversity they are striving for (expertise, competence, gender) 
and/or gives examples (50% women) 
3p - Linkage to the ability to create value. The strategy of the nomination committee and/or the 
suggested board members is in line with the strategy and goals of the organization. 
  
Justification: 
According to Kollegiet (2010) Swedish listed companies should have a nomination committee 
whose function is to propose board members. The nomination committee is appointed at the 
annual meeting of shareholders or in another way, which is decided at the general meeting. This 
question is not explicitly mentioned in the <IR> framework. However, it is included here based 
on the discussion in PwC bästa bolagsstyrningsrapportering 2012 (2013b) and GRI-G4 (2013). 
In PwC’s report (PwC 2013b) there is a discussion on how weak today’s reporting is on why a 
certain person is nominated for the board. The authors want the nomination committee to report 
on what profiles in the board they are looking for. Furthermore, the authors wish the committee 
would connect their nomination to the organization’s strategy and goal. This approach is 
supported by the GRI-G4 (2013), which states that the organizations should report on how and 
based on what criteria the board members are nominated and selected. The overall conclusion 
is that the work of the nomination committee is of great importance for the value creation 
process of a company.  
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Guidance: 
The text below is taken from TeliaSonera’s annual report 2013 as an example of how to reach 
3p. 
 
Figure 2: Scoring example of question 1b  
(Source: TeliaSonera’s annual report 2013 p. 35) 
 
The report mentions and describes the different types of diversity relevant for the nomination 
committee, for instance gender distribution and competences, which gives them 1p and 2p. The 
text also provides insight in the working process of the committee and their strategy. They earn 
3p due to the specific requested experiences that are listed and can be related to the strategic 
direction of the company.  
  
Excluded dimensions of area 1 
The <IR> framework also states that the report should inform about whether regulatory 
requirements influence the design of the governance structure. In this study this was chosen not 
to be included as a separate question, in order to comment on this on a more general basis. 
There are no requirements for the boards of Swedish listed companies concerning skills, 
diversity or gender. It could be mentioned that Sweden’s neighbor Norway, since 2008, has 
legislated that at least 40 % of the corporate board should be women (Thorburn 2013; Folke & 
Rickne 2012). 
 
The <IR> framework does not mention independence of board members or nomination 
committee. However, other reports (PwC 2013b, GRI-G4 2013, Kollegiet 2010) mention this 
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as a criterion. Several studies have investigated the importance of independence of directors 
with various results (Frías-Aceituno et al. 2013, Byard et al. 2006; Cheng & Courtenay 2006; 
Eng & Mak 2003; García-Sánchez et al. 2011; Prado-Lorenzo & García-Sánchez 2010). As the 
IIRC does not specifically mention independence as a characteristic to report on, this criterion 
was excluded in this study. 
Area 2: Processes 
2a) The strategic decision-making process 
0p - Nothing mentioned 
1p - Mentions something on how strategic decisions are taken, the process and what committees 
there are. 
2p - Describes more thoroughly where and/or how strategic decisions are taken and how 
authority is delegated 
3p - Linkage to the ability to create value by explaining the link between the strategic decision 
making process and strategy, future and/or goals. 
 
Justification:  
The <IR> framework states that the integrated report should give insight about the strategic 
decision making process. PwC (2013b) also highlights that it should be clear what the decision- 
and monitoring process looks like and where in the organization the strategic decisions are 
taken. KPMG (2012) states that there should be a link in the report between the decision making 
process and the business priorities, i.e. strategy and opportunities, as stated earlier in the annual 
report. GRI-G4 (2013) includes that organizations should disclose information on committees 
and how authority is delegated. In the Emerging integrated reporting database (IIRC 2014j) the 
IIRC uses the Crown Estate and Marks & Spencer as good examples. The IIRC states that in 
the integrated report of these companies a description of the different committees are provided. 
By informing on what responsibilities the committees have, the reader understands what 
decisions are delegated to the different committees. Another good example according to IIRC 
(2014j) is Schiphol, who distinctly state what targets the Board is working towards. These 
targets are derived from the company strategy, which, according to IIRC, shows that the top of 
the organization is committed to the strategy.  
 
Guidance: 
The assessing of the compliance with this area demands a more subjective approach. To 
facilitate the assessment and decrease the subjectivity some relevant areas have been in focus. 
What has been taken into consideration when assessing the reports is how well it is understood 
what the different bodies of the company actually do and are responsible for. The company 
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bodies in focus have been the board of directors and the committees since these are of major 
importance to the strategic decision making process. The delegation process mainly focuses on 
the CEO and possible business units. To receive 1p a brief description of the different bodies 
is enough including mentioning what committees there are which, for instance, Scania has done 
in their annual report of 2013. 2p demands more details and it should be clear what decisions 
are taken where. An extensive description of the responsibilities of the board and the 
committees together with an annual agenda for the work of the board contributes to fulfill the 
2p criterion. The 2013 annual report of SEB provides a good example as the report has a 
detailed presentation of the tasks and responsibility of the board and the committees. It also 
describes how authority is delegated by including a description of the CEO and her committees. 
SEB have also received 3p due to the connection between the committees’ work and the 
strategy of the company.   
 
2b) Specific processes used to establish and monitor the culture of the organization, 
including its attitude to risk and mechanisms for addressing integrity and ethical issues 
0p - Nothing mentioned 
1p - Mentions something on how the organization will establish and monitor the desired 
culture.  
2p - Describes, more deeply, the process to achieve the desired culture. How does the company 
ensure that the culture penetrate the company? 
3p - Linkage to the ability to create value. An explanation on why and how the desired culture 
will create value and help the organization reach their goals is provided. 
 
Justification: 
The <IR> framework states that the report should explain the specific processes used to 
establish and monitor the culture of the organization. Culture is not easily defined. In this thesis 
corporate culture is defined as accepted ways to behave, norms and values shared in the 
company (Eriksson-Zetterquist et al. 2005; Tsui et al. 2006). There are different views on 
whether corporate culture can be influenced at all, but Tsui, Zhang, Wang, Xin & Wu (2006) 
conclude it is so. However, as culture is the shared assumptions of an organization, culture is 
not changed until visible among the people (Trice & Beyer 1993). The culture is, for example, 
affected by the governance through the selection of who is promoted and the company dress 
code (Eriksson-Zetterquist et al. 2005). Furthermore, culture can be developed through 
interactions between the people in the company and actions by the leaders (Tsui et al. 2006).  
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The GRI-G4 (2013) includes a question on the role of governance in establishing values. 
Another guideline in the GRI-G4 (2013) is to report on how concerns among the people in the 
company can be communicated which is why whistle-blowing is an example of how to reach 
1p if it is only mentioned and 2p if more details are provided. 
 
In addition, King III (IoDSA 2009) states several responsibilities of the board in managing the 
company ethics. These include building and sustaining an ethical corporate culture, determining 
and communicating ethical standards, implementing a code of conduct, and assuring 
compliance with this code. In this thesis explanations of these in the annual report are seen as 
examples of how culture is established or monitored.  
 
Guidance: 
This question is, similar to the prior one, a question that demands subjectivity to some extent. 
Since culture has a wide definition it might be hard to identify and interpret the information in 
the annual reports regarding this area. In this study the approach is to explore whether 
companies disclose how they work with establishing and monitoring the culture. To receive 1p 
it is enough to mention some sort of process, for example a whistle blowing system, code of 
conduct or an employee/leadership program, which includes culture. 2p demands a deeper 
explanation of how the process actually is implemented in the company and among the 
employees. IFS has in this study received 1p since they mention their code of conduct but fail 
to communicate in a clear manner how it permeates the organization and how they ensure that 
the employees take part of the code. SKF provides a good example of 2p and 3p in their annual 
report of 2013. Figure 3 describes SKF’s value creation tool “Business Excellence”, where 
“Business Excellence Culture” is included as a process to achieve the desired culture. They 
give actual examples of what is included in the process for instance the “SKF Bridge of 
Excellence”, which they also describe more thoroughly later in the report. This supports the 2p 
criterion. 3p are earned since they explain the connection between the culture and the value 
creation. 
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Figure 3: Scoring example of question 2b  
(Source: SKF’s annual report 2013 p. 29) 
 
Area 3: Actions by the board 
3a) Board activities during the year – strategic 
0p - Nothing mentioned 
1p - Mentions something, generically, that could be the same year after year. 
2p - Describes by giving multiple specific, not generic, examples of what has been discussed 
and actions taken. 
3p - Linkage to the ability to create value. What has been discussed on the board is clearly 
linked to the strategy and there is an explanation of why particular actions have been taken. 
This can be described in another part of the annual report. 
 
Justification: 
The <IR> framework states that the report should explain what actions those charged with 
governance have taken to influence and monitor the strategic direction of the organization. In 
order to fully meet the requirement of <IR> this matter should be linked to the organization’s 
ability to create value. It is important to report on activities so that stakeholders, who often are 
separated from the management in large organizations, know what has happened (Crowther 
2002). IIRC states that this explanation provides insight about what the board finds strategically 
important. 
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Guidance:  
Important in the assessment of this area, both question 3a and 3b, is to distinguish between 
generically written text and information that can be related to the specific period of time. It is 
common to find the requested information in the corporate governance report but it may appear 
in other parts as well. To fulfill the criteria it must be clear that the actions are taken by the 
board or the committees, which consist of board members. Latour is one of the companies in 
the study which has received 1p since their presentation of the board’s strategic activities is 
generic, see figure 4. Even though acquisitions are mentioned as discussed on the board and the 
fact that more information on specific acquisitions from the year can be found in other parts of 
the Latour report, they do not receive more than 1p since it is not clearly stated that the board 
has been involved in those specific acquisitions. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: 1st scoring example of question 3a  
(Source: Latour’s annual report 2013 p.63) 
 
To gain 2p it is necessary to give at least two specific examples of strategic actions taken by 
the board. According to the IIRC (2014j) Marks & Spencer’s annual report is a good example 
of how actions by the governance should be disclosed. Figure 5 is taken from their 2013 annual 
report. Marks & Spencer gives several examples of what has been discussed and actions taken 
by the board grouped by the main areas of focus. Further down in the report the actions of the 
different committees are well explained. Marks & Spencer also clearly links some of their 
actions to the strategy, both in the figure “Board activity 2012/2013” as well as in the 
surrounding text. According to the scoring system of this thesis the criterion for 3p is met. 
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Figure 5: 2nd scoring example of question 3a  
 (Source: Marks & Spencer’s annual report 2013 p. 43) 
 
3b) Board activities during the year - organization’s approach to risk management 
0p - Nothing mentioned 
1p - Mentions something, but generically, that could be the same year after year. 
2p - Describes by giving specific, not generic, examples of how the approach to risk 
management has been influenced and monitored by the board during the year. 
3p - Linkage to the ability to create value. An explanation is provided about the actions of the 
board concerning its approach to risk management and their link to the strategy is clear. This 
can be described in another part of the annual report. 
 
Justification: 
In the third bullet point of the content element governance in the <IR> framework, it is also 
included that board activities executed to influence and monitor the organization’s approach to 
risk management should be stated in the integrated report. It is very important to disclose on 
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how risk is managed, as it is a prominent factor in raising confidence in the market, which 
reduces cost of capital (Solomon 2010). The GRI-G4 (2013) includes that organizations should 
report on how risks are identified and dealt with as well as the board’s role and actions in 
reviewing the effectiveness. 
 
Worth noticing is that the <IR> framework contains another content element called “Risks and 
opportunities”. This content element aims to guide companies on how to inform stakeholders 
about the main risks and opportunities that the company is facing, how these might affect the 
value creation process and how the company handles them. Question 3b in the scoring system 
is not to be mistaken for the content element “Risks and opportunities”. Question 3b aims to 
help assess whether an annual report disclose information about what specific actions that has 
been taken by the board and/or the committees to influence risk management.  
 
Guidance: 
As stated above in the section of guidance in question 3a, it is relevant to distinguish generic 
text from information that can actually be connected to the reported period of time. 1p is earned 
by mentioning some sort of action taken by the board to influence the risk management but 
which is presented in a generic way. The 2013 annual report of Mekonomen provides a typical 
example of how to earn 1p, see figure 6.   
 
Figure 6: 1st scoring example of question 3b  
(Source: Mekonomen’s annual report p. 65) 
 
Mekonomen states that the board is involved in the process of establishing a policy regarding 
financial risks. Mentioning this type of policy established by the board is enough for 1p. 
However, the example above is a generically written text, which can be used every year. To 
earn 2p and 3p additional information regarding at least one specific action is needed. Figure 7 
is taken from Marks & Spencer’s annual report of 2013 and is one example of how to earn 2p 
and 3p. Marks & Spencer writes in their governance section about the board’s approach to risk 
management and specifically explains the actions taken and connect it to strategy.  
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Figure 7: 2nd scoring example of question 3b  
(Source: Marks & Spencer’s annual report 2013 p. 45) 
 
Area 4: Culture 
4) Reflection of culture when using and affecting the capitals11 
0p: Nothing mentioned on the culture of the company. 
1p: Mentions what culture (values and norms) the company is striving for. 
2p: Describes the current culture of the company and how it affects how business is conducted.  
3p: Linkage to the ability to create value. An explanation is provided about how the culture 
guides the business and how this in turn supports value creation. 
 
Justification: 
The <IR> framework states that the integrated report should include information on how the 
culture, ethics and values are taken into consideration when capitals are used and affected. In 
this question ethics and values are included in the definition of culture. Culture was defined in 
connection with question 2b as accepted ways to behave, norms and values shared in the 
company. Examples of how culture can affect the business is when choosing to do business in 
                                               
11  Capitals were defined in section 2.1.3 as resources and relationships used and affected by an 
organization. 
   
 75 
certain areas of the world, or refusing some areas, and when choosing what type of products to 
develop. According to King III (IoDSA 2009), the board is responsible for ensuring that the 
culture is consistent with the way business is done. 
 
Guidance:  
To further gain understanding of area 4 and how it differs from question 2b, figure 8 is attached 
below. While question 2b focuses on the implementation of the culture, area 4 aims to assess 
how the existing culture affects the actions of the company and the company’s way of using 
their capitals.  
 
Figure 8: Explanation of the difference between question 2b and 4   
 
To earn 1p it is enough to mention something about the culture of the company. Gunnebo, for 
example, mentions in the annual report of 2013 their core values and that these values guide 
the employees in their relations to different stakeholders. For this they receive 1p. 2p is not 
achieved since it would demand a deeper explanation of the values and more specific examples 
of how the values guide the employees. TeliaSonera’s annual report of 2013 has received 3p. 
Figure 9 shows the structure of TeliaSonera’s group-wide governance framework, which is 
thoroughly explained in their governance report. The surrounding text clearly elaborates the 
values and ethics with actual examples of how the values have influenced the actions. 
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Figure 9: Scoring example of question 4  
(Source: TeliaSonera’s annual report 2013 p. 40) 
 
Scania’s annual report from 2013 is another example of how to earn 3p. In the beginning of the 
report they mention and describe their core values, as a part of their strategy, and these recur 
throughout the report. Scania gives clear examples of how value is created and the connection 
to the core values are prominent.  
Area 5: Governance practices that exceed legal requirements 
Excluded from the scoring system  
Area 6: Innovation 
6) Responsibility taken by those charged with governance for promoting and enabling 
innovation 
0p - Nothing mentioned 
1p - Mentions that innovation is supported in the company in some way. 
2p - Describes how those charged with governance take responsibility for promoting and 
enabling innovation and/or gives examples of how innovation is promoted. 
3p - Linkage to the ability to create value. The report explains why those charged with 
governance take responsibility for promoting and enabling innovation and links it to the 
organization’s strategy. 
 
Justification:  
This question is completely based on the sixth guideline in paragraph 4.9 of the <IR> 
framework. The IIRC (2013a) states that innovation is important for the organization, as it is a 
value driver, meaning it affects the organization’s ability to create value over time. Innovation 
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can take different forms. It can be product changes, process changes, shifts from satisfying the 
demand of customers by products to product-services and lastly system changes, which is a 
broad type of innovation, changing a factor in the foundation of the business, for example the 
shift from imported agricultural products to locally produced (Ashford & Hall 2011). Lately, 
companies have realized that sustainability is more than just doing good; focusing on it creates 
profitable business (Deloitte 2012). A business that is not sustainable does not have a long-term 
value. Innovation can increase sustainability, by reducing use of energy, chemicals, water and 
materials and emissions of carbon and waste (Ashford & Hall 2011; Deloitte 2012). 
Communication on how innovation is supported by the board of directors signals confidence 
and accountability. The <IR> framework states that the responsibility those charged with 
governance take for promoting and enabling innovation should be disclosed. Therefore, this 
was included as a question in the scoring system. 
 
Guidance:  
The aim of this question is to help assess whether a company in its annual report communicates 
how the company and, above all, those charged with governance support innovation and what 
they actually do to enable innovation. Simply writing that innovation is important does not 
equal 1p. One must explicitly involve the company and what is done to enhance innovation. 
Below three examples are included to further express the difference between 0p and 1p.  
 
Mekonomen states in their annual report of 2013 that innovation is important, see figure 10, 
but nowhere do they mention what they do to make sure the company is innovative. Therefore 
they do not receive 1p.  
 
Figure 10: 1st scoring example of question 6  
(Source: Mekonomen’s annual report 2013 p. 5) 
 
Cloetta, on the other hand, gives multiple examples of how innovation is supported. Examples 
include studies of consumption patterns and consumer panels online. Furthermore, they explain 
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the process of innovation, see figure 11. One of these would have been enough for 1p if it was 
clearly linked to innovation. However, 2p cannot be reached without mentioning the board and 
its responsibility for innovation.  
 
 
Figure 11: 2nd scoring example of question 6  
(Source: Cloetta’s annual report 2013 p.14) 
 
SKF is the third example. They write in their annual report of 2013 that they award innovative 
employees. By disclosing this they achieve 1p.  
 
2p and 3p demands a clear connection to those charged with governance. The 2013 annual 
report of Saab is a good example of how to achieve both 2p and 3p. In the beginning of the 
report the chairman of the board talks about the importance of innovation and what is done to 
enhance innovation. This fulfills the criterion for 2p. Even if the chairman does not explicitly 
mention what the board has done, the fact that he mentions what the company is doing to 
support innovation signals involvement and support from the board, and is enough for 2p in 
this scoring system. Saab has also earned 3p since they link innovation to value creation, by 
including innovation in the strategy. Many companies might do this, explain how innovation 
helps create value, but without a clear statement on how the board supports innovation no more 
than 1p can be earned. 
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Area 7: Remuneration and incentives 
7) Remuneration and incentives’ link to value creation 
0p - Nothing in the report on why the executives have a certain salary 
1p - Mentions that there is a process for determining remuneration and incentives.  
2p - Describes why certain remuneration and incentives to the board of directors, CEO and 
top management are chosen and what they are based on. 
3p - Linkage to value creation. The report explains the reason for the remuneration structure. 
Remuneration and incentives to the board of directors, CEO and top management are linked 
to performance and execution of the strategy; the use of and effect on the capitals. Both 
financial and non-financial parameters, in a long-term perspective, are considered. 
 
Justification: 
This question is based on the last bullet point in the <IR> framework’s content element 
governance. The use of remuneration to managers based on financial performance is known to 
bring managers’ and shareholders’ interest together, reducing agency problems (Solomon 
2010). The <IR> framework states that remuneration and incentives should be explained. In 
this thesis the remuneration and incentives to the board of directors, CEO and top management 
will be assessed. These should be linked to value creation in the short, medium and long term 
(IIRC 2013b). The criterion for 3p is based on this as well as the report by KPMG (2012). The 
report indicates that the remuneration should be linked to delivery of business strategy and 
value, and this should be explained in the integrated report.  
 
The GRI-G4 (2013) includes several guidelines on the area of remuneration and incentives. 
These state for example that the report should include the type of remuneration, i.e. fixed or 
variable pay, how the remuneration and incentives are linked to financial as well as non-
financial goals, short-term as well as long-term and the process behind remuneration, i.e. how 
and by whom remuneration and incentive structures are determined. 
 
The IIRC (2014j) states BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto as two examples that explain the process 
behind remuneration and incentives in a clear way. This is done through explaining how the 
structure of the remuneration promotes a good execution of the strategy and how it is measured, 
informing the reader of what performance is aimed for and how it is rewarded. 
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Guidance: 
The typical way of receiving 1p is to mention the existence of a remuneration committee. 2p 
requires more details and figure 12 illustrates how to earn it. The text is taken from the 2013 
annual report of Scania and describes the purpose of the remuneration as well as what it is based 
on.  
 
Figure 12: 1st scoring example of question 7  
(Source: Scania’s annual report 2013 p.109) 
 
To earn 3p the linkage to value creation must be prominent. Mekonomen has in their annual 
report of 2013 managed to do that, see figure 13.  
 
 
Figure 13: 2nd scoring example of question 7  
(Source: Mekonomen’s annual report 2013 p.28) 
 
In order to receive 2p or 3p the annual report does not have to include enough information on 
all parts of the remuneration and incentive structure. Information on for example only the 
remuneration to top management is enough, given that it fulfills the criteria in the question.  
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Area 8: Statement by the board of directors 
8) Statement by the board of directors 
0p - No statement by the board of directors 
1p - A statement by the board of directors somewhere in the annual report 
2p - A statement by the board of directors introducing the corporate governance report 
3p - A statement by the board of directors answering all aspects stated in paragraph 1.20 of 
the <IR> framework 
 
Justification: 
This is not included as a guideline in the content element governance in the <IR> framework. 
However, in the beginning of the <IR> framework (paragraph 1.20, see appendix 3) it is stated 
as a demand for integrated reporting. Furthermore, when PwC (2013a) assessed how far 
Swedish large cap companies had come towards integrated reporting, this was one of two 
questions in the area of governance.  
 
The difference between 1p and 2p has its foundation in an interview with Bo Lagerström12. 
According to him it is in the corporate governance report that the statement should be.  
 
Guidance: 
One can easily assess whether 0p, 1p or 2p is earned. However the 3p criterion demands insight 
in paragraph 1.20 of the <IR> framework, which is attached in appendix 3. The basic content 
of the paragraph is that an integrated report should include a statement from those charged with 
governance that explains their role and responsibility of the integrated report. Another issue to 
highlight is if a statement by the board is found outside the corporate governance report, but 
with a shorter statement introducing the corporate governance report, it has been assessed as 
enough for 2p. Additionally, if a statement from those charged with governance was found 
immediately before the corporate governance report it was enough for 2p.  
 
 
                                               
12 Bo Lagerström, partner and specialist in corporate reporting at PwC, telephone interview February 
11th 2014. 
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Appendix 2 - The scoring table 
Name of company:________________________________________________ 
 Question 0p 1p 2p 3p 
1a Composition of the board 
0p - Nothing mentioned 
1p - Mentions the characteristics of the board. 
2p - Describes with a text/info-graphics the diversity and/or gender equality of the current board. 
3p - Linkage to the ability to create value. There is a discussion on why the board has the chosen composition and how it is linked to the 
business model. 
    
1b Nomination process 
0p - Nothing mentioned about the characteristics behind the nomination process of the board 
1p - Mentions that some sort of diversity is one of the goals when choosing new board members. 
2p - Describes what kind of diversity they are striving for (expertise, competence, gender) and/or gives examples (50% women) 
3p - Linkage to the ability to create value. The strategy of the nomination committee and/or the suggested board members is in line with 
the strategy and goals of the organization. 
    
2a The strategic decision-making process 
0p - Nothing mentioned 
1p - Mentions something on how strategic decisions are taken, the process and what committees there are. 
2p - Describes more thoroughly where and/or how strategic decisions are taken and how authority is delegated 
3p - Linkage to the ability to create value by explaining the link between the decision-making process and strategy, future and/or goals. 
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  0p 1p 2p 3p 
2b Specific processes used to establish and monitor the culture of the organization, including its attitude to risk and mechanisms for 
addressing integrity and ethical issues 
0p - Nothing mentioned 
1p - Mentions something on how the organization will establish and monitor the desired culture. 
2p - Describes, more deeply, the process to achieve the desired culture. How does the company ensure that the culture penetrate the 
company? 
3p - Linkage to the ability to create value. An explanation on why and how the desired culture will create value and help the organization 
reach their goals is provided. 
    
3a Board activities during the year-strategic 
0p - Nothing mentioned 
1p - Mentions something, generically, that could be the same year after year. 
2p - Describes by giving multiple specific, not generic, examples of what has been discussed and actions taken. 
3p - Linkage to the ability to create value. What has been discussed on the board is clearly linked to the strategy and there is an 
explanation of why particular actions have been taken. This can be described in another part of the annual report. 
    
3b Board activities during the year - organization’s approach to risk management 
0p - Nothing mentioned 
1p - Mentions something, but generically, that could be the same year after year. 
2p - Describes by giving specific, not generic, examples of how the approach to risk management has been influenced and monitored by 
the board during the year. 
3p - Linkage to the ability to create value. An explanation is provided about the actions of the board concerning its approach to risk 
management and their link to the strategy is clear. This can be described in another part of the annual report. 
    
4 Reflection of culture when using and affecting the capitals 
0p - Nothing mentioned on the culture of the company. 
1p - Mentions what culture (values and norms) the company is striving for. 
2p - Describes the current culture of the company and how it affects how business is conducted.  
3p - Linkage to the ability to create value. An explanation is provided about how the culture guides the business and how this in turn 
supports value creation. 
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  0p 1p 2p 3p 
6 Responsibility taken by those charged with governance for promoting and enabling innovation 
0p - Nothing mentioned 
1p - Mentions that innovation is supported in the company in some way. 
2p - Describes how those charged with governance take responsibility for promoting and enabling innovation and/or gives examples of 
how innovation is promoted. 
3p - Linkage to the ability to create value. The report explains why those charged with governance take responsibility for promoting and 
enabling innovation and links it to the organization’s strategy. 
    
7 Remuneration and incentives’ link to value creation 
0p - Nothing in the report on why the executives have a certain salary 
1p - Mentions that there is a process for determining remuneration and incentives 
2p - Describes why certain remuneration and incentives to the board of directors, CEO and top management are chosen and what they 
are based on. 
3p - Linkage to value creation. The report explains the reason for the remuneration structure. Remuneration and incentives to the board 
of directors, CEO and top management are linked to performance and execution of the strategy; the use of and effect on the capitals. 
Both financial and non-financial parameters, in a long-term perspective, are considered. 
    
8 Statement by the board of directors 
0p - No statement by the board of directors 
1p - A statement by the board of directors somewhere in the annual report 
2p - A statement by the board of directors introducing the corporate governance report 
3p - A statement by the board of directors answering all aspects stated in paragraph 1.20 of the <IR> framework. 
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Appendix 3 - Paragraph 1.20 
 
 
Source: IIRC 2013b p. 9 
 
 
